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Abstract 
Latin America has recently experienced three cycles of capital inflows, the first two ending in major 
financial crises.  The first took place between 1973 and the 1982 ‘debt-crisis’.  The second took place 
between the 1989 ‘Brady bonds’ agreement (and the beginning of the economic reforms and 
financial liberalisation that followed) and the Argentinian 2001/2002 crisis, and ended up with four 
major crises (as well as the 1997 one in East Asia) — Mexico (1994), Brazil (1999), and two in 
Argentina (1995 and 2001/2).  Finally, the third inflow-cycle began in 2003 as soon as international 
financial markets felt reassured by the surprisingly neo-liberal orientation of President Lula’s 
government; this cycle intensified in 2004 with the beginning of a (purely speculative) commodity 
price-boom, and actually strengthened after a brief interlude following the 2008 global financial 
crash — and at the time of writing (mid-2011) this cycle is still unfolding, although already showing 
considerable signs of distress.  The main aim of this paper is to analyse the financial crises resulting 
from this second cycle (both in LA and in East Asia) from the perspective of Keynesian/ Minskyian/ 
Kindlebergian financial economics.  I will attempt to show that no matter how diversely these newly 
financially liberalised Developing Countries tried to deal with the absorption problem created by the 
subsequent surges of inflow (and they did follow different routes), they invariably ended up in a 
major crisis.  As a result (and despite the insistence of mainstream analysis), these financial crises 
took place mostly due to factors that were intrinsic (or inherent) to the workings of over-liquid and 
under-regulated financial markets — and as such, they were both fully deserved and fairly 
predictable.  Furthermore, these crises point not just to major market failures, but to a systemic 
market failure: evidence suggests that these crises were the spontaneous outcome of actions by 
utility-maximising agents, freely operating in friendly (‘light-touch’) regulated, over-liquid financial 
markets.  That is, these crises are clear examples that financial markets can be driven by buyers 
who take little notice of underlying values — i.e., by investors who have incentives to interpret 
information in a biased fashion in a systematic way.  Thus, ‘fat tails’ also occurred because under 
these circumstances there is a high likelihood of self-made disastrous events.  In other words, 
markets are not always right — indeed, in the case of financial markets they can be seriously wrong 
as a whole.  Also, as the recent collapse of ‘MF Global’ indicates, the capacity of ‘utility-maximising’ 
agents operating in (excessively) ‘friendly-regulated’ and over-liquid financial market to learn from 
previous mistakes seems rather limited.  
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“The problem is that [...] the theories embedded in  
general equilibrium dynamics [...] don't let us think  
about [issues such as ...] financial crises and their  
real consequences in Asian and Latin America [...].”  
Robert Lucas 
 
“‘Swollen’ financial markets tend to produce  
socially useless products and innovations.” 
Chair, Financial Service Authority 
 
   "I can [understand and] calculate the motions of the heavenly bodies,  
but not the madness of [the South Sea Bubble] people." 
Isaac Newton 
 
“Globalization opened up opportunities to find new people  
to exploit their ignorance. And we found them.” 
Joseph Stiglitz 
 
“When you combine ignorance and leverage,  
you get some pretty interesting results.” 
Warren Buffett 
 
“[...] and, above all, let finance be primarily national.”  
 John Maynard Keynes 
 
 
1.-  Introduction 
Latin America (LA) has experienced three cycles of capital inflows since the mid-1970s, 
the first two ending in major financial crises.  The first cycle took place between the oil 
price increase that followed the 1973 ‘Yom Kippur’ war and the 1982 debt-crisis, with 
Chile (the only country in the region that had already fully opened up its capital account) 
being the most affected — with a 20% drop in its real GDP between the third quarters of 
1981 and 1983.2  The second cycle took place between the 1989 ‘Brady bonds’ 
agreement (and the beginning of the economic reforms and financial liberalisation that 
followed) and the Argentinian 2001/2002 crisis, and ended up with four major crises (as 
well as the 1997 one in East Asia) — one in Mexico (1994), one in Brazil (1999), and two 
in Argentina (1995, the ‘Tequila-crisis’, and 2001/2).  Finally, the third inflow-cycle began 
in 2003 as soon as international financial markets felt reassured by the surprisingly neo-
liberal orientation of President Lula da Silva’s government.  This cycle intensified in 2004 
with the beginning of a (speculation-led) commodity price-boom, and actually 
strengthened after a brief interlude following the 2008 global financial crash — and at the 
time of writing (mid-2011) this cycle is still unfolding, but it is already showing 
considerable signs of distress.3   
The main aim of this paper is to analyse the dynamics of the second cycle — from 
the 1989 ‘Brady-bonds agreement’ to the Argentinian 2001/2002 crisis (and 9/11).  Two 
common characteristics of the financial crises resulting from this second cycle — in both 
LA and East Asia (EA)— are that the countries involved had recently opened up their 
capital accounts, and that they had done so at a time of high liquidity in international 
                                      
2  For this first cycle, see Díaz-Alejandro (1984); Ffrench-Davis (2010); Marcel and Palma (1988); 
and Palma (1998).  
3  Some authors have argued that the third cycle finished in 2008, and a fourth cycle began after 
the downturn in 2009; however, I disagree because for LA the so-called fourth cycle is nothing but 
the resumption of the third after a brief pause in 2008 — led by the same type of inflows, and by 
the same commodity-price boom (see Figures 2 and 3 below).  For how these three financial cycles 
relate to the long-term ‘technology-cycle’, see Pérez (2002).  
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financial markets, and slow growth in most OECD economies.  That is, at a time when 
ever more liquid, volatile and progressively un-regulated international financial markets 
were anxiously seeking new high-yield investment opportunities — hopefully also 
uncorrelated with their existing portfolio!  
This paper will attempt to show that no matter how diversely these newly 
financially liberalised Developing Countries (DCs) in both LA and EA tried to deal with the 
absorption problem created by the subsequent inflow-surges (and they did follow 
different routes), they invariably ended up in a major financial crisis.  I shall identify 
three different ways in which these DCs tried to deal with massive surges of inflow, and 
conclude that each of them led to a financial crisis via a different path.  These are best 
illustrated by (i) the Mexican 1988-1994 experience — henceforth ‘route 1’ (the “try to 
keep public finances in balance, and let markets resolve the resulting private imbalances 
by themselves” route), with Chile and Argentina (at least until its ‘Tequila crisis’ of 
1994/5) following the same route;4 (ii) the Brazilian 1994-1999 one — ‘route 2’, 
characterised by a country that tried to avoid becoming ‘another route-1-Mexico’ via an 
aggressive sterilisation and tough monetary policy; and (iii) the Korean 1988-1997 one 
— ‘route 3’ (where most inflows were used to finance private investment, in a scenario of 
falling corporate profitability), which also included Malaysia and Thailand.  
This paper further attempts to show that all three ‘routes’ led to financial crises in 
ways that have little to do with the financial processes described in the most popular 
mainstream models of financial crises — in particular ‘second-’ and ‘third-generation’ 
ones — especially with their supposed unpredictable and undeserved nature.5  That is, 
the key proposition of this paper is that the common feature of all three routes to 
financial crises during the second cycle is that the resulting crises were both (fairly) 
predictable and (certainly) deserved.  Basically, they were the outcome of economies 
opting to integrate fully (and indiscriminately) into international capital markets via an 
open capital account, and then being unable to absorb the subsequent surge of inflows 
(no matter how hard they tried to deal with them).  The experiences of China, India and 
Taiwan during the same period (as well as those of Chile and Colombia in the 1990s, 
when they implemented ‘price-based’ capital controls) show that a more selective path of 
participation in international capital markets is a far more effective way of avoiding the 
pro-cyclical dynamics of unrestricted capital flows — or the huge costs of sterilisation 
(Ocampo and Palma, 2008).  They also help avoid the massive costs in the alternate 
phase of the cycle, associated with stampedes by intrinsically restless (and often under-
informed) fund-managers — so prone to oscillating between manias and panics.  
 
2.-  International financial markets and the three main stylised facts of 
capital flows into middle-income DCs since the liberalisation of their capital 
accounts 
 
2.1. Opening up to an world of financial ‘virtual realities’  
 
Following Kindleberger, my main contention is that the most likely source of a financial 
                                      
4  Although Chile’s 1982-crisis belongs to the first cycle, as Chile opened-up of its capital account 
two decades before the rest of the region, its 1982 crisis resembles a ‘route-1’ crisis (for a full 
account of the process of economic reform in Chile, see Ffrench-Davis, 2010).  In terms of 
Argentina, this country was the only one that, when first in trouble (1995), managed to continue 
with the same policies for several years thanks to generous IMF help and some skilful — but 
eventually self-defeating — ‘financial engineering’.  Therefore, events between its two crises (1995 
and 2001) are unique, and do not really fit into any of the ‘routes’.  However, for reasons of space 
I cannot discuss in detail the intricacies of these events (1995-2001).  For analyses, see 
Chudnovsky (2002); and O’Connell (2002).  
5  For a brief description of ‘first-’, ‘second-’ and ‘third-generation’ models, see Appendix 1; see 
also Krugman (2001). 
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crisis is a sudden surge of liquidity.  The financial crises studied here are no exception.  
So, the starting point of the analysis has to be the “when, how and why” there was this 
increase in liquidity — and how its ‘clearing process’ led to increased ‘leverages’, asset-
price bubbles, and the opening-up of new and more risky ‘liquidity-outlets’.  The 
‘rediscovery’ of DCs is an example of the latter, and the sub-prime mortgage-market is 
another creation of a new ‘outlet’ to unload excess liquidity.  In fact, in the US financial 
markets not only issued nearly half a trillion dollars in sub-prime mortgages, but, 
according to the WSJ, in 2007 alone the number of new credit-card solicitations mailed to 
sub-prime borrowers reached more than 1.3 million (http://finance.yahoo.com/news/ 
bringing-expired-debt-back-to-life.html).  In other words, financial markets became so 
liquid that almost any financial asset could be sold with ease — no matter how toxic it 
may be.  This ‘liquidity-clearing process’, in turn, leads to increased (Minskyian) financial 
fragilities.  In fact, one way of looking at how liquid international financial markets had 
become during the second and third inflow-cycles is that between 1980 and 2007 (i.e., 
between the beginning of financial de-regulation with Thatcher and Reagan, and the year 
before the current global financial crisis), the four components of the stock of global 
financial assets (equity, public and private bonds and bank assets) jumped 9-fold in real 
terms (to US$241 trillion).  As a result, as a multiple of world output the stock of 
financial assets jumped from 1.1 to 4.4 (see Palma, 2009a).  
In turn, the outstanding amounts of over-the-counter derivative contracts 
increased from 2.4 to 11 times the size of global output.  And the gross market value of 
these ‘financial weapons of mass destruction’ grew eight times faster than world output.  
In fact, just those involving commodities increased 59-fold during the same decade (BIS, 
2011; excludes gold).  This frantic speculation is certainly more important than China or 
India in explaining the post-2003 boom in commodity prices.  Also, in terms of emerging 
markets, total assets for single-manager hedge funds whose primary investment focus 
were DCs grew 4.5-fold in only the three years before 2008 — with emerging market 
equity managers becoming the best niche group in the hedge fund industry (returning on 
average 37%; HFR, 2007). 
In terms of players in the ‘shadow financial market’, the total number of hedge 
funds and funds of funds grew from 610 to nearly 10 thousand between 1990 and 2007, 
with total assets at that time of nearly US$2 trillion (and total market ‘positions’ of 
US$5.3 trillion).  In fact, even after the LTCM debacle in 1998 the number of hedge funds 
(and LTCM’s business model) continued to expand as if nothing had ever happened — or, 
rather, as if life could continue ever more enjoyably as there was now the guarantee that 
the Fed would always be available at the other end of a 911 call.  And an indication of 
their shadiness is that of these funds 53% were registered in the Caribbean, 25% in 
Delaware, and only 1.3% in New York. 
Two of the main problems emerging from these post-1980 increasingly liquid and 
un-regulated international financial markets were the increased volatility and the 
correlation of returns on financial assets.  In fact, now shockwaves are transmitted — 
and amplified — to such an extent that a simple way of looking at the onset of the 
2007/8 financial crisis would be to say that (long-delayed) concerns over US$500 billion 
of ‘sub-prime’ mortgage lending led to the wiping off of more than US$40 trillion in global 
asset markets.  In fact, it used to be that when the US sneezed, the rest of the world 
caught a cold; now it is enough for Greece to sneeze, for the rest of the world to catch 
pneumonia.  And these are the international financial markets to which LA and EA — and 
countries of Eastern Europe and of the European periphery — chose to open their capital 
accounts fully.  The irony is that this was done, supposedly, in search of diminishing 
uncertainty and counter-cyclical finance!  As Summers once famously said, for DCs to 
open capital accounts without capital controls has proved to be like building a nuclear 
plant without safety valves 
Figure 1 shows the massive ‘financial deepening’ that took place in the above 
economies just in the five years between 9/11 and the 2007/8 global financial crises.  
 
 
 6
FIGURE 1 
 
●  Ger=Germany; Sw=Sweden; Sp=Spain; Gr=Greece; Po=Portugal; Ir=Ireland; LA=Latin 
America; ME=Middle East; Af=Africa; EE=Eastern Europe.   
●  Source:  IMF (2011a).  As mentioned above, the four components of the stock of financial 
assets are the capitalisation of stock markets, public and private bonds, and bank assets.  The 
source does not report data for Iceland.6   
 
Basically, in only five years the above countries increased the value of their stock of 
financial assets by an amount larger than a whole GDP: Ireland by 3.6 GDPs; Spain 2.3; 
Asia 1.8; and Greece (of all countries) by 1.3.  That this happened in countries with 
dynamic growth, such as China or India, could plausibly have some justification in the 
eyes of financial liberalisers (as ‘irrational exuberance’).  Also in Ireland something was 
actually happening in the real economy.  But that it took place in Portugal (0.9% growth 
p.a. for GDP, and 15% for financial assets), Greece (4.3% and 24%), or Spain (3.5% 
and 27%) can only be labelled as surreal — i.e., the outcome of ‘self-regulation’ in 
financial markets becoming freedom to run amok, and ‘market discipline’ becoming a joke.  
Something similar happened in LA (4.8% and 27%), Africa (5.7% and 30%), or Eastern 
Europe (5.6% and 45%).   
These asymmetries between the real and the financial economy are precisely what 
FDR tried to avoid with the ‘New-Deal’-type financial regulation, and Keynes with Bretton-
Woods.  Also, they are not exactly what the ‘efficient-market hypothesis’ (especially 
‘strong-form version’ theorists) had in mind when they asserted that in liberalised 
financial markets “prices at all times fully reflect all available information — public and 
private” (Fama, 1976).  In essence, according to this theory there cannot be an 
endogenous gap between prices in financial market and fundamentals — let alone a 
bubble.  That is, asset prices deserve a pedestal, and stock options are therefore the 
most efficient reward for good performance.  Well, not exactly what has happened in the 
                                      
6  According to a senior IMF official, what one has to understand is that “Iceland is no longer a 
country — it is a hedge fund” (quoted in Lewis, 2009).  On Iceland, see Wade and Sigurgeirsdottir 
(2010).   
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increasingly over-liquid and under-regulated post-1980 financial markets!  
2.2.-  The first stylised fact of post-1990 inflows into (newly financially-
liberalised) DCs: a massive surge of highly volatile capital flows  
 
Figure 2 shows the first and crucial stylised fact of post-1990 inflows into these middle-
income DCs: the sudden surge, the high volumes, and the huge instability of these 
inflows.  
FIGURE 2 
 
● Source: ECLAC (2011; total portfolio inflows).  
 
According to mainstream economic theory (and the Washington Consensus discourse), 
full integration into international capital markets should be highly beneficial to DCs with 
‘sound fundamentals’ for a number of reasons, but especially because it should pool risk, 
and provide countercyclical access to finance.  Well, there’s little evidence of that.  In 
fact, since 1990 almost all Latin American countries have had (what in the narrow sense 
of the Washington Consensus is understood as) ‘sound fundamentals’, and remarkably 
easy access to international finance.  However, the outcome of this has been rather 
different from the prediction of mainstream economists and neo-liberal politicians (of all 
political persuasions). As Figure 2 indicates, this has been one of damaging surges of 
inflows, pro-cyclical finance, and hugely increased financial fragility — and augmented 
uncertainty.  In particular, as will become clear below, the key characteristic of ‘route-1’ 
countries in LA was the intensity of the pro-cyclical nature of the surge in inflows when 
these were dealt with following the credo of the ‘efficient-capital-market’ theory, and the 
first law of Welfare Economics — i.e., (i) try to keep public finances in balance; and (ii) 
leave markets to resolve the resulting private imbalances by themselves.   
Looking at LA’s overall scenario since 1990 (in both ‘route-1’ and ‘route-2’ 
countries), if I was asked to put forward the argument for capital controls — as the only 
effective mechanism for dealing with the problem of the volatility of inflows at source — 
Figure 2 would be my ‘Exhibit A’.   
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2.3.-  The second stylised fact: at least in LA, the tsunami of inflows has 
had little or no positive impact on the real economy 
 
Figure 3 indicates the second stylised fact of the surge in (volatile) inflows: given what 
has happened in LA since financial liberalisation, it would be rather difficult to argue that 
the opening up of the capital account c.1990 has had an unambiguous positive impact on 
the real economy — this is true even for FDI!   
FIGURE 3 
 
● pdt=labour productivity.  The percentages in the left-hand Panel are average rates of 
productivity growth for respective periods (1950-1980, 1980-1990, and 1990-2010).  In the right-
hand panel, investment and FDI are 3-year moving averages. 
● Sources: productivity, WB (2011; for output), and GGDC (2011; for employment); investment, 
ECLAC (2011; current prices); net private inflows, ECLAC (2011; for 1950-70), and IMF (2011b; 
for 1970-2010); and FDI, ECLAC (2011).    
 
As the left-hand panel of Figure 3 indicates, before 1980, when inflows averaged less 
than US$ 20 billion per year (in 2010-US$), productivity growth reached 2.6% p.a. 
(3.8% for Brazil).  But when they increased by more than three times (1990-2010), 
productivity growth only reached half the pre-1980 rate (1.2% p.a.; 1.3% for Brazil).  Of 
course the disappointing post-1990 performance in ‘liberalised’ LA has many roots (see 
Palma, 2011a), but there is little doubt that the negative effects of the massive surge of 
(volatile) inflows is part of that narrative.  For example, huge inflows led to a chronic 
deficiency of effective demand for non-commodity tradable activates, especially 
manufacturing; this was the outcome of the ‘deadly triad’ of over-valued exchange rates 
(that switched aggregate demand towards foreign markets); high interest rates (due to 
‘tough’ monetary policies to deal with these inflows); and remarkably low levels of public 
investment by ‘sterilised’ governments (of about 3% of GDP; these were necessary to 
balance public finances in a context of low taxation, as part of the ‘sound fundamentals’ 
shop-window part of the open capital account story).7  Added to this, there was a hugely 
increased uncertainty (especially due to the volatile nature of inflows) affecting especially 
                                      
7  While in OECD countries personal income tax collection reaches on average 9% of GDP, in LA it 
amasses less than 1% — with income tax evasion fluctuating around 50%, equivalent on average 
to 4.5% of GDP (ECLAC, 2010).  From this perspective, there is little doubt that LA confirms 
Schumpeter’s hypothesis that: “[t]he fiscal history of a people is above all an essential part of its 
general history” (1918).   
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private investment.  
One aspect of inflows that is truly remarkable is shown in the right-hand panel of 
Figure 3: a significant surge of inflows of FDI after the ‘Brady-bonds’ agreement and the 
beginning of economic reform — reaching an average of US$ 75 billion a year between 
1988 and 2010 (in 2010-US$; ECLAC, 2011) — has been associated with a remarkably 
poor rate of investment (as a share of GDP).  In fact, despite the growth-acceleration in 
many countries after the post-2003 commodity-price boom and the new surge in inflows, 
as well as the rapid recovery after the 2008 crisis, by 2010 the average investment-share 
of the region was still in its (already disappointing) starting point — with Brazil and 
Venezuela, although for different reasons, lagging behind.  In other words, as Figure 3 
clearly indicates, in LA inflows of FDI equivalent to US$1.8 trillions (1988-2010; 2010-
US$) has been associated with a rate of accumulation that is poor even from the 
perspective of its inadequate historical record —  on average 19% of GDP (ECLAC, 2011; 
see also Palma, 2011a).8   
So, again, not much support here for the mainstream proposition that DCs are full 
of investment opportunities, just waiting for the availability of finance (which, 
supposedly, can only come from rich countries and not from the high proportion of the 
national income appropriated by their élites).  And significant support for the Keynesian 
proposition that the mere availability of finance does not lead to higher levels of 
investment.   
In fact, perhaps the most striking political-economy difference between LA and 
Asia is found in their contrasting relationships between income distribution and 
investment (Figure 4).   
FIGURE 4 
 
● n-3 = third-tier NICs (China, India and Vietnam), and a = Argentina; b = Brazil; cl = Chile; c = 
Colombia; cr = Costa Rica; d = Dominican Republic; e = Ecuador; s = El Salvador; mx = Mexico; 
                                      
8  Part of this phenomenon is the fairly unimpressive rôle of mostly rentier Spanish multinationals, 
only able to operate in (protected) non-tradable activities (including domestic finance and utilities).  
To paraphrase Oscar Wilde, for LA to have been conquered by Spain once may be regarded as a 
misfortune; twice looks like carelessness.  
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p = Paraguay; pe = Peru; u = Uruguay; ve = Venezuela; k = Korea; sg = Singapore; m = 
Malaysia; th = Thailand; cn = China; v = Vietnam; in = India; za = South Africa; and P = 
Philippines.  
● Sources: for income distribution, WDI (2010); for private investment IMF (2010).  
 
While in LA private investment (which usually hovers around 15% of GDP) accounts for 
only one-third of the income-share of the top decile (about 45% of national income), in 
most of Asia this ratio jumps to more than twice that level — with Korea’s even above 1.  
In other words, while LA’s top deciles appropriates twice as much as those of Korea and 
Taiwan, LA’s share of private investment in GDP reaches half the East Asian levels.  From 
my own perspective, this is the most crucial characteristic of the (sub-prime) nature of 
LA’s capitalism: what I like to call the “two-times-half-style capitalism” — i.e., how to 
create an institutional environment in which one can get twice as much, with half the 
effort.9  And FDI, instead of making a positive impact on that asymmetry, has been 
happy to adjust.10  
Oddly enough, in South Africa (in this respect, LA’s honorary middle-income 
country in Africa), and in The Philippines (the honorary one in Asia) similar low ratios as 
those of LA indicate that their capitalist élites have the same Latin preference for having 
their cake and eating it...   
So the usual argument that one of the main reasons why LA needs capital inflows 
is because its many investment opportunities are constrained by finance is rather hollow.  
It is not that in LA lacks investment opportunities (e.g., those associated with forward 
and backward linkages of commodity production); the issue that still needs a more 
elaborate answer is why is it that neither domestic nor foreign capital shows much 
interest in taking advantage of them?  And, again, post-reform LA has shown little 
support for the mainstream argument that says that all that is required for the happy 
union between these investment opportunities and foreign finance are ‘prices right’ and 
‘institutions right’.  The experience of EA shows that effective trade and industrial 
policies, pro-growth macros, and so on are probably more relevant.  
Keith Griffin once wrote that foreign aid may well end up simply substituting 
domestic savings (Griffin, 1970); well, post-reform LA seems to indicate that in DCs FDI 
also could have a strong substituting effect on national private investment — except, of 
course, in Asia!  It is fairly obvious that LA’s capitalist élite has a preference for both 
sumptuous consumption, and for accumulation via mobile assets (financial ones and 
capital flight) rather than via ‘fixed’ capital formation.11  And neo-liberal reforms — 
despite all the efforts towards defining and enforcing property rights, and all the other 
‘market-friendly’ policies aimed at incentivising investment — have had little impact on 
that (in spite of all the resources and foreign exchange provided by inflows, and the 
particularly favourable terms of trade).  Not much evidence here of the supposed 
revitalising effects of ‘financial-deepening’ promised by McKinnon and Shaw.  
In essence, economic reform has been unable to reproduce even the relatively low 
investment rates of the state-led industrialisation period; instead, it seems to have 
unleashed more powerfully the predatory and rentier instincts of the region’s capitalist 
élites (the former especially during the privatisation period).12  In many Asian countries, 
meanwhile, reforms, especially financial liberalisation, may have brought complex 
challenges to the macro, and the inevitable financial fragilities (as well as increased 
inequalities, labour insecurity and so on), but at least the rate of accumulation increased 
significantly after their implementation.  In LA, meanwhile, the cloud did not even have 
that silver lining (Figure 5).   
                                      
9  TFP aficionados, however, may well argue that there is a positive twist in this.   
10  For example, as discussed below, the share of LA in Banco Santander’s worldwide profits is 
twice that of its assets, while in its European operations it is exactly the other way round.  
11  At least easy access to mobile assets helps oligarchies to become democratic (Boix, 2003).  
12  See, for example, Mönckeberg (2001); Wolf (2007); and Winter (2007).   
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FIGURE 5 
Investment patterns in Latin America and Asia, 1950-2010  
 
●  In the left-hand panel, white circles indicate the beginning of economic reform (for India, 1980; 
for Brazil, 1990 — Collor’s ‘New Brazil’ Plan).  In the right=hand panel, percentages shown in the 
graph are growth rates in the respective periods (for Brazil, 1965-1976 and 1980-2010; and for 
Korea, 1960-80, 1981-97 and 1997-2008.  3-year moving averages.   
●  Sources: for investment, WDI (2010); for investment in LA before 1960, CEPAL (2010); in India 
(http://mospi.gov.in/).  For employment, GGDC (2009). 
 
The contrast between Brazil and India is particularly telling (left-hand panel) — both 
countries started their economic reforms with a 22% investment rate in GDP; however, 
by 2010 one (India) had brought this rate up to 37%, while the other (Brazil) had 
brought it down to 19% (WB, 2011; IPEA, 2011).  
The contrast between LA and Asia is even starker when the comparison is drawn 
with investment per worker (right-hand panel).  In Brazil, for example, by 2010 (and 
despite the post-2004 acceleration of growth) investment per worker (in real terms) was 
still well below its 1980 level.  Most LA follows a pattern similar to Brazil.  An extreme 
example is post-NAFTA-Mexico: despite the highest level of FDI per worker in the world, 
by 2010 its investment per worker had also not recovered its 1981 level.  By then, and 
despite 1997, Korea had a level 3.6 times higher, and Malaysia and Thailand 2.2.  In 
turn, China’s 2010 level was 12 times higher; India’s 4.5; and Vietnam had more than 
trebled this statistic since 1994 (the first year that data are available; see Palma, 2011a).  
Perhaps from this perspective the contrasting productivity growth performance of LA and 
many in Asia since 1990 — and especially the inability of LA to sustain productivity 
growth — may not be so difficult to explain after all.  
Furthermore, in the very few cases in LA where investment actually increased 
after reforms, as in Chile, it is not obvious why it took so long for it to happen (ten 
years), let alone why it ran out of steam so easily afterwards (Ffrench-Davis, 2010); 
Palma, 2011a and b).  Moreover, what also remains unclear is why despite the huge 
share of national income appropriated by the top earners, and despite well-defined and 
enforced property-rights, ‘pro-market’ reforms — and a tsunami of FDI — every time 
private investment in LA manages to rise much above 15% of GDP its capitalist élite 
starts experiencing feelings of vertigo. 
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2.4.-  The third stylised fact: the growing costs of capital inflows in terms 
of factor payment abroad  
 
As is evident from Figure 6 the fortunes of LA’s factor payments abroad (interest 
payment, profit repatriation, etc.) took a rather remarkable turn after the appointment of 
Paul Volker (with his flamboyant monetarism) to the Fed in 1979, and the election of 
Reagan a year later — as most of LA’s debt was saddled with flexible interest rates, its 
interest payments on foreign debt alone jumped (in 2010-US$) from US$29 billion in 
1978 to US$95 billion in 1982 (or nearly half the region’s exports).  Unsurprisingly, LA 
ended up with a debt crisis.  
Overall factor payments abroad (debits) then fell from US$108 billion in 1982 to 
US$61 billion in 1992, to then jump again (mostly due to increased profit repatriation by 
FDI) to US$122 billion in 2010 (having reached US$135 billions in 2007 — see Figure 6).  
FIGURE 6 
  
●  NFK=net private capital inflows; and NTR=net transfer of resources (NKF – net factor 
payments).  In left-hand panel, payments are debits.  
●  Source: ECLAC (2011).   
 
As a result, in post-Brady-bonds/economic-reform LA a US$1.5 trillion of net inflows 
(1989-2010) got wiped-out in terms of ‘net transfer of resources’ due to a net factor 
payment abroad of US$1.6 trillion (US$2.3 trillion in terms of debits).  The figures for the 
2000s were net inflows of US$672 billion, and negative net transfers of US$321 billions 
— due to net factor payments of almost US$1 trillion (US$1.4 trillion in debits).  In fact, 
if ‘net’ transfer of resources also excludes increases in reserves (as some have argued 
that it should), the net transfer of resources reaches a negative figure of US$810 billions 
just in the 2000s.  Large inflows, even when they have a strong FDI component, are 
certainly not a free lunch.  
In Chile, for example, towards the end of the 2010s profit repatriation by copper-
FDI alone was equivalent to two-thirds of all public expenditure, and twice the overall 
level of public expenditure in education, health and housing combined.  Furthermore, 
they were equivalent to about 1.6 times Bolivia’s GDP, and twice Paraguay’s GDP.  In 
fact, Chile is one of the few countries in the world with no royalty on mineral extraction 
— as the tax it euphemistically calls ‘royalty’ is a specific tax, not a ‘royalty’; i.e., the 
actual mineral extracted pays no royalty.  Furthermore, as this was not enough, the 
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Concertación government that created this meagre tax gave FDI an additional ‘magical-
realist’ concession: foreign corporations can include this specific tax as a cost of 
production!  With such ‘light-touch’ fiscal attitude, no wonder LA’s ‘new’ left is so 
welcome at Davos...  
 
3.-  The 'three routes' to financial crisis 
Figure 7 shows the crucial issue at stake, common to all these crisis-countries, but 
especially to LA: the remarkable surge in inflows on the heels of financial liberalisation. 
FIGURE 7 
 
● FL=financial liberalisation; FC=financial crisis; Mex=Mexico; Argent=Argentina; 
Malay=Malaysia; and Thai=Thailand. 
● The period ‘between’ covers the years between financial liberalisation and financial crisis.  The 
period ‘before’ covers the same number of years before financial liberalisation. 
● Source: World Bank (2011).   
 
In LA, the turnaround following the opening-up of the capital account is remarkable: (in 
2010-US$) the difference between the two periods amounts to US$277 billion in Brazil, 
US$194 billion in Argentina, and US$125 billion in Mexico; in fact, the turnaround in 
Brazil or in Argentina was larger than in the three East Asian economies together 
(US$153 billion).  These surges are even more impressive in relative terms to exports 
and savings (particularly in Chile).  In fact, some of these countries even began to be 
important players in the newly developed derivatives markets (IMF, 2011a).  
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Foreign capital swamped these countries due to several ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors.  
The main ‘push’ factor consisted of excess liquidity in international financial markets — 
from this perspective, DCs continued to play their historical rôle of ‘financial market of 
last resort’ (Palma, 1998).  As mentioned above, this rôle (emergency ‘liquidity-outlet’) is 
not that different from the one played by the ‘sub-prime’ mortgages during the financial 
cycle that followed 9/11.  Other ‘push’ factors included business cycle conditions, 
changes in interest rates, the rise of institutional investors (such as mutual funds, 
pension funds, hedge funds) always in need of new profitable assets (hopefully also with 
low-correlation in returns with their existing portfolio), and demographic forces in 
industrial countries.  There was, however, a crucial difference between LA and EA in 
terms of the ‘pull factors’.  In EA there was an urgent need for foreign-finance to sustain 
corporate investment in the face of falling profitability; in LA, instead, the key ‘pull factor’ 
was rather the combination of radical economic reforms (in particular wholesale 
privatisations, and the speed and intensity of trade liberalisation) and the opening up of 
the capital account in a context of undervalued asset markets (and when many domestic 
corporations were eager to join the stock market just to attract foreign buyers), high 
interest rate spreads, and expectations of exchange rate appreciation.  In particular, 
optimism regarding the success of economic reforms was in excess-supply, partly as a 
result of the massive ‘spin’ put on them by those to be found circling around the 
‘Washington Consensus’.   
 That is, there was a major difference regarding ‘pull’ factors, as in LA a significant 
proportion of inflows had practically to ‘invent’ a need for themselves (i.e., it was a 
supply in search of a demand — as it takes two to tango).  The key characteristic of LA’s 
‘pull’ factors is that they fed into themselves: inflows were attracted by newly created 
domestic ‘magnetisms’; these inflows generated pro-cyclical dynamics, which attracted 
more inflows.  Finally, a crucial ‘pull’ factor in all routes was the 'moral hazard' created by 
the near-certainty in international financial markets (particularly after 1994-Mexico) that, 
as in every good old Western, the cavalry, in the form of a vast international rescue 
operation, could be counted on to arrive in the nick of time, should the 'natives' threaten to 
default or close their capital account.  
 One way of testing which was the causa causans of the surge in inflows 
(‘exogenous push’ in LA vs. ‘endogenous pull’ in EA), is by looking at the time-sequence 
between changes in the current and in the capital accounts.  The question here is, what 
is the driving force behind the balance of payments cycle?  Does the current account 
‘lead’ the capital account (‘endogenous ‘pull’), or is it the other way round (‘exogenous 
push’)?  This issue can be tested with the help of the Granger ‘time-precedence’ or 
‘predictability’ test (often misleadingly called the Granger-‘causality’ test).  The results of 
this test show a major difference between LA and EA in this ‘chicken-and-egg’-type 
problem: in LA changes in the capital account tend to precede — and are useful for the 
prediction of — changes in the current account, while in EA the time-dynamic is the 
opposite (see Ocampo and Palma, 2008).   
This is also an important finding from the point of view of rôle of capital controls: 
if the primary source of the LA financial cycle is an externally induced (i.e., ‘exogenous 
push’) change in the capital account, controls on inflows are more likely to be a ‘first-
best’ counter-cyclical policy option if one wants to deal with the excesses of the financial 
cycle at their source.  In EA, meanwhile, the results of the test indicate a more 
macroeconomic textbook time-sequence: changes in the current account — the result of 
developments in the domestic real economy — proceed, and are useful to predict, 
changes in the capital account.  It therefore seems less clear that in this region capital 
controls should be the dominant component of a ‘first-best’ policy to deal with the inflow-
problems at source.  This does not mean that capital controls cannot help; it means that 
they are a ‘second-best’ policy, since the ‘first-best’ one would be to deal with the 
domestic problems leading the changes in the current account (e.g., the levels of 
external-finance needed to sustain corporate investment).  
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3.1.-  The Latin American story: to sterilise or not to sterilise a mainly 
‘exogenous push’ of foreign capital – route-1 vs. route-2 
 
Figure 8 shows some of the major differences in LA between Brazil, which decided for 
sterilisation, and Chile, Mexico and Argentina, which decided instead to trust the 
traditional beliefs of the first law of welfare economics: keep public finance in check, and 
let markets solve the resulting private imbalances by themselves.   
FIGURE 8 
 
● [Cl]=Chile; [Mx]=Mexico; [Ar]=Argentina; [Br]=Brazil; [Ko]=Korea; [Ma]=Malaysia; 
[Th]=Thailand; and [KMT]=average of Korea, Malaysia and Thailand.  Percentages in Panels B and 
C are average annual rates of growth.  The percentages for Argentina correspond to 1990-94.  
● Sources: credit to the private sector, World Bank (2011); imports of consumer goods, UN 
(2011); stock markets, DataStream (2011); and exchange rates, IMF (2011a).   
 
In route-1-LA, the response to the surge in private inflows was to ride them out by 
unloading them into the domestic economy via a credit boom (Panel A), and asset 
bubbles (Panel C).13  The other (Brazil), was precisely the reverse: to try to stop the 
                                      
13  Part of the rapid expansion of the domestic-credit ratio in Chile in 1982 is due to a fall in output 
in the latter part of that year (after the onset of the debt-crisis).  Argentina’s lower domestic-credit 
ratios throughout (Panel A) relate to a longstanding (and well-founded) generalised mistrust of 
banks.  In LA, part of the bubble in the stock market (Panel C) was that the opening of the capital 
account involved the sale of state companies as well as the floatation of private corporations.  The 
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resulting pro-cyclical dynamics by placing an ‘iron curtain’ around them in the Central 
Bank (via sterilisation). 
The crucial factor in understanding the different behaviour of Brazil is the timing 
of its financial liberalisation (second half of 1994); this coincided with the unfolding of the 
growing Mexican financial fragilities that led to the December-1994 crisis.  Therefore, 
high degrees of sterilisation and high interest rates were continued after the successes of 
the 'Real Plan' in conquering inflation in order to avoid following a Mexican 'route-1' 
crisis-path.  
Even though there was a similarity in the speed of credit expansion between 
'route-1' and 'route-3', there also was a crucial difference: the use made of this 
additional credit — as mentioned above, while 'route-1' directed it towards increased 
consumption and asset speculation (panels B and C), Korea did so mostly towards 
corporate investment (see Figure 10 below).  In ‘route-1’, a bubble similar to that of 
stocks took place in real estate; in Mexico, for example, the relevant price index jumped 
16-fold between financial liberalisation and financial crisis, while there was little increase 
in the indices of Korea or Brazil (see Palma, 2003a).  Finally, the cases of Malaysia and 
Thailand are characterised by having one foot in each camp.  Their surges in inflows were 
initially necessary to sustain their ambitious private investment programmes — both 
Malaysia and Thailand brought their share of private investment in GDP above 30%.  But, 
contrary to Korea, there was still plenty of ‘spare cash’ after that to follow at least one 
element of 'route-1' too — the spare liquidity fuelled a (near) Latin-style asset bubble in 
their stock markets and real estate.14 
However, remarkably, in these two East Asian countries massive credit expansion 
was associated with a drop in the share of consumption in GDP — in Malaysia this share 
declined by nearly 10 percentage points of GDP (to 56.1%); and in Thailand by 3 
percentage points (to 64.9%).  No sign of a Latin 'route-1' here.  So, probably no other 
macroeconomic variable so transparently demonstrates the different 'routes' to financial 
crises than the behaviour of private consumption (Panel B), and asset prices (Panel C).  
In terms of the former, for example, while in route-2-Brazil sales of new cars grew by 
only 39% between 1994 and 1997 (to fall again by 23% in the months before the 1998-
crisis), in route-1-Argentina they grew five-fold between 1991 and the 1995-‘Tequila-
crisis’ (McKinsey, 2004).  And in terms of the stock market, ‘efficient capital market’ 
theorists were probably not very well acquainted with LA when they stated that stock 
prices are supposed to be a ‘random walk’.15  That is, particularly under risk neutrality, in 
stock markets there is supposed to be no scope for profitable speculation — i.e., a 
rational stock market cannot be beaten on any consistent basis.16  The key point here is 
that if financial markets get misaligned, they are always supposed to ‘self-correct’.  And 
although in LA they surely got misaligned, they certainly failed to ‘self-correct’ — in Chile 
(1975-81), for example, the dollar-denominated value of stocks grew at 87% p.a., or 12 
times faster than real GDP; in Mexico (1988-94), meanwhile, they grew 13 times faster 
than GDP, and in Argentina (1990-94) 6 times faster.   
So, when students are taught these days that smart market players are bound to 
force stock prices to become rational, LA is probably not in the syllabus.  The irony is that 
                                                                                                                       
former were often sold first to domestic capital at much reduced prices, just to be sold again to 
foreign investors at multiples based on expectations of liberalised profit rates.  And the latter were 
often floated just to be sold to foreign capital.  Both operations produced a large private sector 
wealth effect that fuelled financial speculation and funded imports of consumer goods, but led to 
little or no new investments.  This did not happen in Asia; there were no major privatisations, and 
corporations were not floated in the stock market just to make them attractive to ‘gringos.’  
14  In Malaysia there was a 12.3-fold increase in real estate prices, while in Thailand an almost 8-
fold increase (Palma, 2003a).  The same happened in their stock markets (Panel C), but this 
bubble was dwarfed in comparison to Chile or Mexico. 
15  They seem to have been not well acquainted with the US either — see Lo and MacKinlay (2001).  
16  Not surprisingly, Warren Buffett has found amusing the idea that ‘luck’ is supposed to be the 
reason why some investors appear more successful than others (1984).  
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‘rational’ and ‘selfish’ agents (i.e., ‘utility-maximising’ agents) are supposed to do that by 
doing exactly the opposite of what they do in real life: take the other side of trades if 
prices begin to develop a pattern — as this is bound to have no substance, because share 
prices are supposed to exhibit no serial dependencies (meaning that there can be no 
‘patterns’ to asset prices).  In other words, for the efficient market theology a ‘utility-
maximising’ surfer (proficient in rational expectations) is not the one that has fun riding 
waves, but the one that gets drowned trying to create undertows.  
And in the years preceding these financial crises stock prices not only took a 
pattern, but they did so ‘tulip mania’-style — see Panel C for clear examples in which 
market participants, instead of following dutifully ‘non-trending random walks’, were 
quite happy to systematically profit from market 'inefficiencies'.  The key point here is 
that these are clear examples of markets that are driven by buyers who took little notice 
of underlying values — in which investors had incentives to interpret information in a 
biased fashion in a systematic way.  Here, in order to have a financial crisis, there is no 
need for traumatic real-world events — ‘fat tails’ occur mostly because under these 
circumstances there is a high likelihood of self-made catastrophic events.  
Finally, particularly in 'route-1' countries, the surge of inflows also distorted 
‘fundamentals’; panel D shows the case of the remarkable revaluation of real exchange 
rates — in Chile, for example, at a time when the current account deficit was reaching a 
level equal to all exports, and in Mexico, Brazil, and pre-Tequila-crisis Argentina one 
equivalent to about half their exports (or more), their exchange rates were in freefall-
revaluations.  What a contrast with EA; where a fundamental component of their 
Keynesian ‘pro-growth macro’ was to keep the exchange rate competitive and stable 
despite huge inflows and booming exports.   
It is really difficult to fit LA’s real effective exchange rate picture with the basic 
postulate of the neo-liberal creed regarding the need to liberalise, lift ‘artificial’ market 
distortions, and stop governments’ 'discretionary' policies in order to allow the economy 
to get 'its prices right'.  Massive inflows into LA, particularly in relation to exports, and 
the use of exchange rate based stabilisation policies (based on the oldest macroeconomic 
law of them all: one can only solve a macroeconomic imbalance by creating another one) 
brought this crucial price to a level which it would be rather hard to brand as 'right'.   
 Moreover, the current account was not the only casualty of the exchange rate 
overvaluation; the latter was also (not surprisingly) distorting the composition of what 
little investment there was towards the non-tradable sector.  In Mexico, for example, 
whilst investment in residential construction doubled between 1981 and 1994, 
investment in machinery fell by half (and at a time in which trade liberalisation had 
already rendered a significant amount of the stock of capital in manufacturing obsolete; 
Palma, 2005).  Easy access to credit, the distortion in relative prices between tradables 
and non-tradables, and the asset bubble in real estate set in motion a huge Kuznets' 
cycle — not surprisingly, the best performing sector in the Mexican stock market was 
construction. 
This is a rather odd picture: in fact, 'route-1' economies ended up switching the 
engine of growth away from their supposedly desired aim — domestically financed private 
investment in (increasingly sophisticated) tradable production — towards a more laid-back 
(post-modernist?) one of externally financed private consumption, and private 
investment in non-tradable activities and unprocessed commodities (i.e., growth-model 
with a clear bias for ‘low-hanging fruit’-type activities).  
 Finally, the collapse of savings in LA is also definitely not the ‘Promised Land’ of 
McKinnon and Shaw — who (misinterpreting Schumpeter) famously declared in 1973 that 
in DCs the main constrain on savings was financial ‘repression’: in their respective 
periods between financial ‘liberalisation’ and financial crises, gross domestic savings as a 
share of GDP fell in Chile by no less than 13 percentage points, in Brazil by 9, in Mexico 
by 8, and in Argentina by 6 (WB, 2011).  The flipside was booming consumption — in 
Chicago-boys’ Chile, the share of consumption in GDP grew by 10 percentage points (to 
91%!); in Mexico by seven points (to 83%); in Brazil by 6 points (to 85%); and in 
Argentina by 5 points (to 85%; Ibid).  The irony, of course, is that in mainstream 
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macroeconomic textbooks it is still taught today that one of the main benefits of opening 
up the capital account is to smooth consumption over time...   
Given this evidence, it is difficult to understand how, as late as 1996, the World 
Bank (1996) was still preaching to DCs to continue implementing ‘route-1’-type policies 
— i.e., preaching DCs to follow the credo of the ‘efficient-capital-market’ theory, and the 
first law of Welfare Economics.  As mentioned above, the recipe was simple, as recipes 
from the Washington Consensus usually are (in fact, this simplicity is probably one of 
their main analytical attractions!): try to keep public finances in balance; and allow 
markets to resolve the resulting private imbalances by themselves.  All the latter 
required was market discipline, self-regulation, and civilised ‘governance’.   
It is also particularly difficult to understand the mainstream insistence on the 
supposed counter-cyclical nature of inflows, and its aversion to counter-cyclical macro 
and capital controls.  Let alone, its futile persistence in portraying ‘complete markets’ as 
Paradise Lost — the modern-day version of the Garden of Eden!  Even in the very 
unlikely scenario that for finance ‘complete markets’ could do the trick, there is not much 
chance of this utopia taking shape this side of eternity.  
Turning to 'route-2', the crucial vulnerability of Brazil lies mainly in high interest 
rates leading straight into a public sector 'Ponzi'-finance (Figure 9).  
FIGURE 9 
 
● [i]=annualised nominal interest rate paid for public debt; [p]=annual growth-rates of public 
revenues; and [r]=income received for foreign-exchange reserves (assumed to be the domestic-
currency-equivalent to returns on US Treasury Bills).  Domestic currency, nominal terms.17 
● [a]=Mexican crisis; [b]=East Asian crisis; [c]=Russian default; and [d]=domestic default by the 
State of Minas Gerais. 
● Sources:  BCB (2011); and Palma (2002b, and 2006).  
 
 
                                      
17  Inflation between 1995 and 1998 was relatively low: the wholesale price index increased by 
6.4%, 8.1%, 7.8% and only 1.5%, respectively. 
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First, the Brazilian Central Bank over-reacted to external shocks (an attitude I have 
elsewhere called 'macho-monetarism'; see Palma, 2006).  In fact, at times — and even 
when there was no fear of devaluation — the Brazilian Central Bank set deposit rates as 
much as 20 percentage-points above international rates plus country risk.  The crucial 
ideological point to understand here is that these were post ‘UK-ERM-crisis’ times, when 
‘collective memories’ (and second generation models) were directing all the blame for 
financial crises towards Central Banks’ trepidation for interest rate hikes.  That is, 
financial crises were supposed to be the exclusive territory of feeble central 
bankers/finance ministers — in the case of the UK, for example, Norman Lamont’s 
imperfect commitment to a currency peg.  The uniqueness of the Brazilian political 
economy scenario is that the ‘macho-monetarist’ macro that emerged from this 
understanding of ‘second-generation’ crises (‘one should not be afraid to do what it 
takes’ macro) left a much longer-lasting effect — in fact, with other factors, it generated 
a path-dependent dynamic that lasts until today (leading Brazil to the highest real 
interest rates in the world).18  Not surprisingly, in its last financial report Banco 
Santander indicates that one-quarter of all its world-wide profits came from its Brazilian 
operations despite this country having only half that share in its overall assets; 
meanwhile, in both Spain and the UK the relationship is exactly the other way round.  In 
other words, Santander’s profit margins in Brazil are about three times higher than those 
in Spain and in the UK — 32% in Brazil (as of September 30th, 2011, trailing twelve 
months — or ttm), while in its operations in Spain (Banco Santander Central Hispánico) it 
only managed 12.6%.  In fact, Santander’s ‘operating margin’ in Brazil reached no less 
than 48% (ttm, same period; see http://finance.yahoo.com/q/ks?s=BSBR).19  And these 
asymmetries are not the result of current European difficulties, as they have been going 
on for a long time.  These asymmetries form a crucial part of the already mentioned 
Latin-American ‘two-times-half-style-capitalism’, in which (compared with other parts of 
the world) institutional arrangements and political settlements are such that the domestic 
élite and foreign corporations are able, grosso modo, to get twice as much with half the 
effort.20 
Second, the resulting high cost of sterilisation becomes evident in the difference 
between what was paid for the paper sold to sterilise and what was recuperated from the 
return on their holding of foreign-exchange reserves (i.e., between lines 'i' and 'r' in 
Figure 9).  Finally, Brazil systematically violated the so-called fiscal ‘golden-rule', by 
paying a much higher rate for its public debt than the rate at which it managed to 
increase public revenues (let alone its income per capita; on these issues, see Lopes, 
2009).  
 Furthermore, the levels of lending rates that followed were remarkable: the 
annualised real interest rate paid for working capital peaked at 60%, while that for 
consumer credit did so at 115%.  With these rates, of course, hardly any financial asset 
                                      
18  A recent study by Brazil’s ‘Fecomercio’ indicated that “[t]he interest rate on credit cards in 
Brazil's financial hub of Sao Paulo averages 238%.”  See http://finance.yahoo.com/news/ 
Creditcard-debt-may-threaten-apf-3046211331.html?x=0.  With such ‘light-touch’ financial 
regulation (that allows this type of interest rate), no wonder LA’s ‘new’ left is paraded as an 
example in the annual meetings of the IMF and the World Bank...   
19  In the last count no less than 43% of Santander’s profits were generated in Latin America, 20 
percentage points more than in all its huge Continental Europe operations.  And in terms of the 
retail side of business, the regional contrast is even more staggering (http://tippie.uiowa.edu/ 
henry/reports11/std_sp11.pdf).  
20  For example, the latest OECD report on broadband-related statistics (June 2011) indicates that 
among its 34 members Chile has the highest charge for the minimum cost of a monthly 
subscription (1.6 times the average), but in terms of service it has the slowest download speed 
(just one-quarter of the average).  So, followed closely by Mexico, the only other Latin American 
country in the OECD), Chile has the top spot in this ‘asymmetry table’ (http://www.oecd.org/ 
document/54/0,3746,en_2649_34225_38690102 _1_1_1_1,00.html#prices).  And the same 
phenomenon (to get twice as much with half the effort) is also found in education, and many other 
activities.   
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of the banking system (made of household and corporate debt) could perform; as 
discussed elsewhere, non-performing loans — as well as a remarkable lack of 
‘transparency’ in the banking sector, weak regulatory public institutions, and the end of 
‘inflation-income’ by the banking system — led to a succession of banking crises, each 
adding a significant amount to the stock of the public-sector debt due to a populist policy 
of indiscriminate bail-outs of both private and public banks.21  
In fact, the ease with which the government could finance its domestic debt was 
due primarily to private banks falling over themselves to buy public paper, as this was 
just about the only financial asset that could perform at such rates.  Regarding the rest 
of their portfolio, private banks (not having read — or, probably, having read but not 
understood — Stiglitz) tried to increase profitability by the self-defeating policy of ever 
increasing spreads, leading to an even faster increasing non-performing debt (see Lopes, 
2009; and Palma, 2006).  No prizes for guessing in which country (in both regions) the 
crisis of the domestic banking system came before the overall financial crisis (and was a 
major component that led up to it), as opposed to countries in which the banking crisis 
came after the crash, when sharp devaluations hit both sides of banks’ balance sheets — 
leading to exploding foreign exchange liabilities, and bank-portfolio becoming non-
performing due to falling incomes and asset-price deflation.   
The case of Brazil is also very important for the critique of ‘moral-hazard-type’ 
crisis-analysis.  For example, according to McKinnon and Pill (1997), the main cause of 
agents losing their capacity to assess and price their risk properly is that internal and 
external moral hazards lead to ‘artificially’ low interest rates; these, in turn, gave a false 
incentive to accumulate excessive amounts of private (let alone public) risk.  However, in 
Brazil, although high interest rates did help to avoid a ‘route-1’ crisis, they did so by 
creating a different (but equally damaging) one (‘route-2’).  So, the magical realism of 
Brazil’s ‘route-2’ is that it created a financial crisis by trying to avoid one...  
 
3.2.-  The East Asia story of an ‘endogenous pull’ of foreign capital: the 
cost of maintaining high levels of investment in the face of rapidly falling 
profit-rates 
 
In a sense, EA’s story is less transparent than LA’s.  Inflows were not as remarkably 
large and their composition was more stable; real effective exchange rates remained 
stable; current accounts deficits, when looked at as share of exports, were small; interest 
rates were low and stable, and there was no consumption boom, no collapse of savings, 
and no deficits in the public sector.  So, what about the often-mentioned moral-hazard-
led investment boom?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                      
21  Although part of the Real stabilisation package had been the introduction of Basle capital rules 
for the banking system, these rules proved hopelessly insufficient for the financial fragilities created 
by such high interest rates.  
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FIGURE 10 
 
● [M&T]=average of Malaysia and Thailand.  [H]=households; [G]=government; [F]=balance of 
the financial account of the balance of payments; and [C]=corporate sector.  Sectoral surpluses are 
the differences between sectoral savings and investment.   
● Sources: for private investment, IMF (2011b); and for Korea’s sectoral surpluses, KCB (2011).  
 
As mentioned above, the left-hand panel of Figure 10 shows that in LA (despite the 
tsunami of FDI) private investment seems to find a 'natural ceiling’ at about 15% of GDP, 
while in ‘Schumpeterian’ EA it seems to be twice as high.22  Furthermore, the graph 
(using IMF data) also shows that in Korea, Malaysia and Thailand there is little evidence 
of a pre-1997 ‘moral-hazard-led’ investment boom (as third-generation models and the 
IMF would like us to believe; see Krugman, 2001 and IMF, 1998).  Therefore, the key 
question that still needs to be answered is why the Korean corporate sector needed such 
large capital inflows to finance an ambitious but relatively stable investment effort.  The 
right-hand panel provides the answer.  
As discussed in detail elsewhere (Palma 2003a), and mainly due to declining 
profitability (a decline which had little to do with the Krugman TFP-type critique of Korea, 
and a lot to do with a ‘technology-led’ collapse of micro-electronic prices),23 the corporate 
sector had to finance its high, but relatively stable, levels of investment switching from 
retained-profits to debt.  This process caused the sectoral deficit of the corporate sector 
to increase from about 5% to nearly 20% of GNP, absorbing in the process not only all 
the increase in the surplus of the ‘foreign sector’, but also that of the household and 
government sectors as well.24  
                                      
22  Note that in LA the decision to sterilise or not to sterilise — and the corresponding huge interest 
rates differentials — made little difference in terms of private investment.  
23  The D-Ram price per megabyte, for example, fell from US$26 (1995) to US$10 (1996), US$4 
(1997), and less than US$1 (1998).  Memory-chips were one of Korea's main export items. 
24  Daewoo alone, for example, ended up with a corporate debt of US$80 billion — more than the 
combined foreign debt of Chile and Colombia.  One obvious question is why is it that Korean 
corporations did not float equities in domestic and international markets, rather than acquire so 
much debt?  The answer is that even if they wanted to do so (something which is not clear, as 
Korean corporations are very 'tight' — i.e., the last thing they want is other groups, let alone 
foreigners, meddling in their internal affairs), there were at the time strict rules limiting foreign 
ownership of domestic corporations.  At the same time, in the Greenspan era, interest rates were 
not just low, but Korean corporations could borrow with less than one percentage point spread over 
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 Consequently, is the IMF (1998) right when it blames (together with other critics 
of the ‘East Asian model’) all on 'over'-investment?  The answer is (as is so often the 
case) more complex than a typically 'Washington Consensus' one.  The crucial issue that 
leads to misunderstandings in the East Asian crisis is forgetting that once you have gone 
into the type of high-tech exports characteristics of the region, you can only be 
competitive if able to produce at the cutting-edge of (a rapidly changing) technology.  
And to be able to remain at that level, there seems to be little option but to invest at 
East-Asian heights.  Therefore, when profitability collapsed, the choice for Korea was not 
that of 'blackboard economics' – of having the technological choice of being able to 
produce a given amount of output (e.g., memory-chips) with different combinations of 
capital and labour.  Rather it was whether to stay in the micro-electronics business 
altogether, or to look for a new type of development pattern elsewhere (and in doing so, 
allowing in the process for a significant amount of its accumulated physical, human, 
institutional, and social capital to depreciate).  In the memory-chip business, for 
example, this meant that Korea had to invest what it took to catch-up with Taiwan’s 
breakthrough into a 16-megabyte D-Ram chip, or to leave the industry — as nobody 
wanted to buy Korea’s obsolete 4-megabyte chip.  That is, investing what it took to keep 
exporting micro-chips, or switch to exporting potato-chips (as it were).  Or even better, 
instead of exporting D-Ram memory-chips, why not follow the Latin American example — 
with its above-mentioned ‘low-hanging-fruit-type’ export-style — and return to the less 
capital-intensive silk and seaweed, Korea's two main exports before its massive 
industrialisation drive? 
In fact, what might have been an effective solution for EA as a whole was a 
Keynesian-style programme of regional investment co-ordination, as what triggered the 
collapse of the price of the D-Ram memory in 1995 was massive new Taiwanese 
investment coming on stream at the wrong time (i.e., when prices were already 
weakening due to a rapidly growing supply).  
 
4.-  The day of reckoning 
Unsurprisingly, given the size and instability of inflows and macroeconomic imbalances, 
Minskyian financial fragilities quickly began to emerge — fragilities that were specific to 
each 'route'.  Furthermore, countries in all three routes also had to face three common 
problems: (i) shortening of the term structure of their foreign debt (in Thailand, for 
example, the share of short-term debt in total debt grew from 15% to 52% between the 
beginning of financial liberalisation and the 1997-crisis; IMF, 2011b).25  ii) In turn, there 
was a rapid decline in the ratio of reserves to short term debt (in Mexico this ratio fell 
from 1.6 in 1993 to 0.6 in 1994, while in Brazil it did so from 1.2 in 1995 to 0.6 in 1998).  
And (iii) the constant danger that in a financially liberalised economy the attack could 
also come from ‘within' (particularly when the ratio of ‘reserves to M2’ became 
particularly low — in Mexico, for example, this ratio fell from 23% in 1993 to just 5% in 
1994).   
In sum, 'route-1' countries, after massive surges in inflows tried to keep public 
finances in balance, and hoped that markets would resolve the resulting private 
imbalances.  As it happened, the result was rather different from that predicted by 
mainstream thinking; it was a path to financial crisis led by an explosion of credit to the 
private sector, declining levels of interest rates after price-stabilisation, and a rapid real-
exchange revaluation.  All of these produced consumption booms, asset bubbles (both in 
stocks and in real estate), collapsing saving, deteriorating current accounts, a bias in the 
already low levels of investment towards residential construction, and growing non-
                                                                                                                       
treasury bills.  So, debt was very cheap, and in plentiful supply. 
25  If the 1997 crisis was so ‘unpredictable’, why were financial markets shortening their exposure 
to Thailand like this?   
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performing bank-assets.26  The imbalances created by the liberalisation of capital 
accounts, instead of being tamed by ‘automatic stabilisers’, were amplified by automatic 
‘destabilisers’ (Stiglitz, 2003).  In the meantime, foreign and domestic debts exploded, 
while the term structure of the foreign debt deteriorated, and the balance-sheet of the 
corporate and banking sector became ever more vulnerable to currency depreciation.  
This route generated so many financial fragilities that it did not take much for it to face a 
sudden collapse of confidence and an abrupt withdrawal of finance, leading to major 
financial crises. 
As in LA, events helping to precipitate such collapses are never in short supply, 
financial crises did follow.  In 1994 Mexico, for example, in just the twelve months before 
the December crisis, (among other events) there was a massive indigenous uprising in 
Chiapas (January); the assassination of the presidential candidate of the ruling party (the 
PRI, March); a not-very-transparent presidential election (August); the assassination of 
the Secretary General of the PRI (September, with the widespread belief that the 
President had been involved in both assassinations); and a Central Bank that would only 
release information on foreign reserves every four months (giving ‘insiders’ a huge 
advantage) — and all these events, of course, providing plenty of political thrill 
(Armendáriz, 2003).  Basically, in DCs ‘utility maximising cum rational expectations’ 
agents and ‘free’ markets are a little bit more complex (and original) than the idealised 
fictional constructions of mainstream models.  In fact, at the end of 1994 it only took a 
relatively small external shock (a tiny increase in US interest rates in November, which 
produced a minor bond crisis) for the debacle to take place (Kregel, 1998; Palma, 
2003a). 
In the case of Argentina, the crucial issue seems to have been the difference 
between the two periods (1990-1994 and 1995-2001).  During the first, it followed 
mostly a ‘route-1’ path to financial crisis; in the second, it got into an endless (and 
eventually futile) ‘crisis management’ mode due to its refusal to devalue and readjust 
after its 1995 ‘Tequila’ crisis.27   
All these crises represented huge costs for the respective economies; in Chile, for 
example, the ‘Chicago-boys’ experiment ended-up with a 20% drop in GDP (third 
quarters of 1981 and 1983), with unemployment over 30%, and with the share of the 
population in absolute poverty doubling to 55%.  Furthermore, the cumulative cost of the 
rescue of the banking system was equivalent to 43% of GDP; in addition, the 
‘administrative’ cost of this rescue reached an extra 9% of GDP (Barandiarán and 
Hernández, 1999; see also Díaz-Alejandro, 1984, and Palma, 1998).   
The path to financial crisis for 'route-2'-Brazil also started with a surge in inflows; 
but the scene was soon dominated by the effort to avoid becoming ‘another Mexico’.  
High interest rates and sterilisation were successful in avoiding a repeat of ‘route-1’, and 
in consolidating price-stabilisation; but soon created massive domestic financial fragility 
in the banking sector and in state-government finances, leading to an increase in public 
debt through continuous (often indiscriminate and sometimes politically corrupt) private 
and public banking and state-government rescue activities.28  Moreover, this public debt 
exploded due to high interest rates — i.e., a public sector ‘Ponzi’ finance ballooned out of 
control — while the real economy imploded because of these rates.  But high interest 
rates became ever more necessary in order to sustain the ‘peg’ and avoid both further 
                                      
26  Non-performing loans in Mexico's banks reached nearly 10% of GDP in 1994 (see Kregel, 1998).   
27  In 1995, Argentina’s ‘Macho-monetarist’ Finance Minister (Domingo Cavallo) called his Chilean 
counterpart at the time of the 1982 crisis a ‘Sissy’ for having abandoned convertibility after the 
crisis (and devalued the currency).   
28  One of these was the cost of Cardoso’s re-election.  In order to get the required majority in 
Parliament for constitutional change that would allow a President to run for re-election, Cardoso 
offered the opposition (that held many key state governments) to exchange their huge states’ debt 
for low-interest ones, and to inject capital into states’ banks.  The direct cost of this operations 
(US$100 billion; see Lopes, 2009, and Palma, 2006) probably made him the most expensive ‘ego’ 
in Brazilian political history.  
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domestic banking crises due to high foreign-exchange liabilities in the financial sector, 
and a stampede by edgy fund managers.29  Again, it did not take much (just one of many 
of Yeltsin’s follies in 1998, and a minor internal political crisis — a state-governor 
declaring moratorium on its state debt with the Central Bank — for this route to end up 
in a major financial crisis. 
Finally, in 'route-3' countries, there was another massive surge in inflows leading 
to an increase of private credit at low interest rates.  However, this did not lead to 
consumption booms, or collapses of saving — and in Korea not even to asset bubbles in 
the stock market or real estate.  Rather, in the context of declining profitability 
(particularly the sphere of microelectronics due to collapsing prices), there was a high 
(though stable) level of investment — in a world where there was competitiveness only 
at the cutting-edge of a very rapidly changing technology.  This ended up producing 
corporate debt/equity ratios that even in this part of the world should have caused 
dizziness.  Added to this, Korea had same bizarre regulation that gave the corporate 
sector a strong incentive to borrow abroad 'short’ (long-term borrowing had to face 
significantly more red tape), and a Central Bank that seemed to have enjoyed the thrill of 
living dangerously with low levels of reserves.  The resulting rapid decline in the ratio of 
reserves to short-term debt made Korea particularly vulnerable to events in Thailand and 
Malaysia (at the time of the Thai devaluation, Korean reserves could only cover half its 
short-term liabilities; in fact, they were not even enough to cover debt with 90 days 
maturity or less). 
Again — and despite a stunning growth record, and fundamentals that although 
not perfect were the envy of most DCs — it did not take much (international financial 
markets turning their attention to south-east Asia with some trepidation due to the 
return of Hong Kong to Chinese rule), for this route to also encounter a major financial 
crisis.30  Basically, voracious fund managers — eager to profit from long-standing but 
only precipitately acknowledged ‘peccadilloes’ (the precarious balance-sheet structure of 
the Thai banking system) — had a much-delayed collapse of confidence that led to bank 
runs and a major financial crises. 
 
5.-  So, how can one explain that most of the economic profession, 
financial markets and the financial press still insist that these crises were 
mostly ‘undeserved’ and ‘unpredictable’ (i.e., why do they insist at barking 
up the wrong tree)?    
 
It is difficult to understand the mainstream insistence that most of the blame for these 
crises should lie on very specific and supposedly avoidable ‘exogenous’ issues — i.e., 
external to the spontaneous working of highly liquid financial markets.  And in some 
cases, just on ‘chance’.  Financial markets (no matter how over-liquid they are) are 
supposed to have the intrinsic ability to supply effectively the credit intermediation and 
payment services that are needed for the real economy to continue on its growth path.  
So, if unmanageable financial instability occurs one of two things tends to be the excuse: 
either a ‘missing’ market is creating a market ‘failure’, or something ‘foreign’ is meddling 
in these markets.  On the whole, the second alternative tends to be favoured in the 
position of culprit.  In the case of Mexico, for example, most of the attention in 
mainstream literature has been diverted towards a relatively expansionary macro-policy 
in an election year; in Brazil, towards the political stalemate that delayed endlessly a 
necessary fiscal reform (a ‘Waiting for Godot’-type story); in Korea, towards a 
supposedly ‘moral-hazard driven over-investment-cum-corporate-debt’ story; and in 
                                      
29  Also, it became politically difficult to lower interest rates, as the middle classes got accustomed 
to high returns on their savings.  
30 The Thai government was forced to float the baht on the 2nd of July 1997, one day after the 
British transfer of Hong Kong to China.  
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Thailand, towards a ‘crony-capitalist driven unbalanced-balance-sheet’ story’.  In a way, 
this mainstream attitude of barking up the wrong tree is no different from what 
happened after the 2008 financial crisis, when the usual suspects blamed everything on 
China and/or Greenspan, or pointed at ‘liberals’ for the 1977 law that helps low-income 
people get mortgages.  Anything would do (including the fall of the Berlin Wall, excessive 
testosterone in trading rooms, or even sunspots! — see Palma, 2009a for the ‘blame 
list’), except the possibility that the autonomous outcome of the free interaction of 
supposedly utility-maximising agents, interacting in (excessively) ‘friendly-regulated’ and 
over-liquid financial markets, could be an endogenous financial crisis (rather than some 
sort of ‘equilibrium’).   
 So, how can one explain this attitude from most of the economic profession, 
financial markets, and the financial press?  The answer to this complex question has at 
least four components.  The Wall Street Journal provides a good insight into the first one; 
in an editorial soon after the beginning of the ‘sub-prime’ crisis it stated that: “The recent 
market turmoil is [...] raising the stock of one person: a little-known economist whose 
views have suddenly become very popular [...] Hyman Minsky.” (WSJ, 18 August 2007).  
Perhaps had they read (and, more importantly, had they read and understood) such 
obscure economists as Keynes, Minsky, Kindleberger and so many others (including 
Stiglitz, and the later work of Krugman) the Wall Street Journal (otherwise known as the 
Pravda of Wall Street) could have become more effective at predicting financial crises — 
and at realising how ‘deserved’ they usually are.  They might even have learnt how 
avoidable they could become under a revamp set of FDR/Keynesian-Bretton-Woods-type 
arrangements.31  
This also applies to the ‘new’ left which, when in government, often follows 
extreme versions of the mainstream orthodoxy (both in developing and developed 
countries).  In terms of ‘friendly’ regulation of financial markets, for example, nothing 
beats ‘purity of belief’ of New Labour in the form of Gordon Brown’s Financial Service 
Authority (FSA).  When in 1997 he created a new regulatory body for the financial 
industry (the FSA), he set it up not only as an ‘independent non-governmental body’ 
(i.e., a company limited by guarantee), but also as one that was actually financed by the 
financial services industry.  Furthermore, he appointed ex-bankers as Chairman, Chief 
Executive Officer and non-executive directors.  That is, he set the FSA up as 
operationally independent of Government, funded entirely by the financial corporations it 
was supposed to regulate, and led by financial-industry insiders.  Thus, New Labour 
found a rather ingenious solution to the problem of ‘regulatory capture’; if, supposedly, 
lobbyists inevitably succeed in capturing the regulators, why not make them the 
regulators in the first place?32   
With this (‘limited-touch’) attitude towards financial regulation, perhaps it is not 
surprising that at the beginning of the current financial crisis the first bank failure took 
place in the UK (one year before Lehman’s Brothers) — becoming the first UK bank in 
150 years to suffer a traditional bank run.  In fact, in the UK the regulatory failings in the 
lead up to the current financial crisis were such that for many observers it came as no 
surprise that its new Chair tried to regain ‘the moral high ground’ with his speech at the 
2011 annual Mansion House banquet hosted by the Lord Mayor of London (see epigraph 
at the beginning of the paper).  
In fact, I sometimes wonder whether mainstream economics today is just 
shorthand for ‘nothing left to decide’ — and, of course, ‘nothing left to think about 
critically’ (Palma, 2009b).  Indeed, the attitude of many mainstream economists towards 
policy-making (before and after the current crisis) resembles Lord Kelvin’s attitude 
towards physics at the end of the 19th century, when he famously declared that in 
physics “there is nothing new to be discovered now.  All that remains is more and more 
                                      
31  See, for example, Epstein and Pollin (2011).  
32  Probably this is what Brown meant when he famously declared that his policy on financial 
regulation was “... not just a light touch, but a limited touch one” (see http://www.cbi.org.uk/ 
ndbs/press.nsf/0363c1f07c6ca12a8025671c00381cc7/ee59d1c32ce4ec12802570c70041152c?).   
 26
precise measurement.” (Kelvin, 1900)  From this perspective, the incapacity of 
mainstream economists to consider alternative points of view is such that even the so-
called ‘New Keynesians’ still work within a ‘complete markets’ paradigm, and with the 
strongest version of the efficient-markets hypothesis (Buiter, 2009).  
Along this line, perhaps the most amusing definition by a mainstream economist 
of what ‘heterodox economics’ is all about is found in a Working Paper of the Chilean 
Central Bank (that analyses the post-1982 banking crisis in Chile); according to the 
authors, “[t]he Chilean solution to the crisis was heterodox in the sense that many 
policies appear to have been arbitrary, and policy mistakes were made [..] along the 
way.” (Barandiarán and Hernández, 1999).  This attitude towards alternative points of 
view can only be explained by the usual dynamics of idealisation: when there is an 
unremitting need to sustain the idealisation of something (in this case, that of a 
remarkably simplistic view of markets in the face of so much evidence against it the form 
of recurring ‘endogenous’ financial crises), what is needed is simultaneously to demonise 
something else (in this case, anything to do with alternative views).  In fact, the more 
evident the flaws of what is being idealised, the stronger the demonisation of the 
alternative view has to be.33  
Second, another (closely related) part of the answer to the above question is that 
in LA, as in most of the Anglo-American world, economic reforms were carried out with a 
peculiar political ideology — what I like to call the ‘Anglo-Iberian’ neo-liberal 
fundamentalism — where ‘toxic ideas’ were as damaging as ‘toxic assets’ in the lead up 
to the many financial crises discussed in this paper.34  A case in point is Gustavo Franco, 
the President of the Brazilian Central Bank who led Brazil into the 1999 financial crisis; 
for him, "[the alternative for Brazilians today] is to be neo-liberal or neo-idiotic [neo-
burros].” (Veja, 15 November 1996).  And, of course, “burros” (and ‘obscure’ 
economists, such as Minsky) belong in intellectual Gulags.  In fact, for Franco, his main 
task in government was to help “...undo forty years of stupidity.”35  With this Anglo-
Iberian ‘reverse-gear’ attitude, LA’s experiment in economic reform and financial 
liberalisation almost inevitably ended up as an exercise in ‘not-very-creative’ destruction.   
This reminds me of what Keynes once said (discussing Say’s Law) about Ricardo 
conquering England as completely as the Holy Inquisition conquered Spain.  Something 
similar has happened in LA, where neo-liberalism has conquered the region, including 
many in its left-wing intelligentsia, just as fiercely as the Holy Inquisition conquered 
Spain.  In fact, this process has been so successful that it has actually had the effect of 
‘closing the imagination’ to conceptualising alternatives. 
Third, another part of the answer to the above question is the way in which many 
within mainstream economics, international financial markets and the financial press 
have interpreted economic news along the cycles that have led to a financial crisis.  
Following Steiner’s (1993) psychoanalytical understanding of the difficulties of the 
human mind to recognise reality when faced with particularly complex and emotionally 
charged problems — and of its failure to live with them, and suffer their consequences — 
I distinguish three stages in the ‘problem (or bad news)-awareness’ cycle: an initial ‘lack-
of-awareness’ phase, which is eventually followed by a (short-lived) ‘sudden-awareness’ 
stage, and then by a ‘new form of lack-of-problem-awareness’ scenario.  In the first 
(mania) phase of each financial cycle, which could be called the initial ‘turning-a-blind-
eye’ stage, good news is often overstated and bad news simply ignored.  And if 
eventually some bad news can no longer be ignored (e.g., in the current crisis, when in 
August 2007 HSBC announced increased provisions for non-performing sub-prime 
mortgages), this is reluctantly acknowledged but in the clear understanding that 
                                      
33  For an analysis of the process of idealisation, see Sodré (2009). 
34  In fact, we now know that Greenspan was even against tightening regulation against financial 
fraud, as (supposedly) rational markets can take care of themselves in this front as well. (http:// 
www.dailykos.com/ story/2009/3/27/172419/727)  
35  For Keynes, instead, the opening-up of an economy “... should not be a matter of tearing up 
roots but of slowly training a plant to grow in a different direction.” (1933; 759)  
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‘everything is still under control’ — even though most of the pieces of the crisis-puzzle 
are (or should be) already evident (see, for example, Figure 1).  
The second stage of the ‘bad-news-awareness’ cycle comes to the fore when a 
catastrophic event suddenly reveals what so far has been denied (e.g., in the current 
cycle, Lehman’s demise) — and reality sets in.  Now there is an abrupt turn towards total 
panic, to total dismay.  Suddenly, bad news is felt as devastating (and sometimes is even 
exaggerated) and everybody seems completely overwhelmed by the catastrophe.  
According to Greenspan, for example, this happened to him after Lehman’s, and his 
reaction was one of ‘shocked disbelief’; he then famously acknowledged to a 
Congressional Committee that what he found was nothing short of “...a flaw in my 
economic ideology — in the conceptual framework with which I dealt with reality.”  And 
he was “...very distressed by that fact.”  And when asked “[i]n other words, you found 
that your view of the world, your ideology, was not right, it was not working?”  He replied 
“[yes] — precisely. That's precisely the reason I was shocked, because I had been going 
for 40 years or more [...] [with the idea that my view of the world] was working 
exceptionally well.” (http://www.pbs.org/ newshour/bb/business/july-dec08/crisishearing 
_10-23.html)   
However, this second stage in the ‘problem-awareness cycle’ seems to be short-
lived because it is often followed by a further twist (at the time of writing, what is 
currently going on in the global financial crisis).  Basically, soon after the ‘sudden-
awareness’ stage there is a turn towards a new form of ‘lack-of-awareness’ — a retreat 
from the (unbearable) shock into a new form of omnipotence.  In a nutshell, the extent 
of the crash and its (ideological and analytical) repercussions are so devastating that 
they cannot any longer be acknowledged.  When in the second stage ‘truth’ is 
recognised, it is found to be unbearable.  Its sustainable recognition would involve a loss 
of what kept us going, and the mourning of this loss is too difficult.  So, the ‘shocked 
disbelief’ begins to fizzle out, and reality begins to be evaded, misrepresented, distorted 
and covered up in a new ‘lack-of-awareness’ scenario.  The most important issue here is 
that (very conveniently) it is as if nothing needs to be properly mourned — especially the 
economic ideology responsible for the crisis (the ‘toxic ideas’ that lead to the financial 
crises).  After all, the current global financial crisis is (or should be) to the grandiose 
Reagan & Thatcher neo-liberal counter-reformation, what the fall of the Berlin Wall was 
to the Communist paradigm.  Only a new form of ‘lack of awareness’ can help avoid this.  
This new attitude can best be described as “actually, I can take all this on my chin; no 
need to have my economic ideology knocked down.”  In any case, this must be the fault 
of the ‘usual (and more familiar, and less threatening) suspects’!  That is, in order to 
sustain the status quo after the crash there is a new need to cover up, evade and distort.  
So, the focus of attention quickly (and conveniently) switched from the distressing idea 
of the self-destructive nature of unregulated and over-liquid financial markets, to the 
more familiar terrain of problems relating to China (how could it not be China!), labour 
‘rigidities’, uncontrolled immigration, excessive regulation, and (for sure) ‘big 
government’.36  And in the UK, of course, the European Union!  ‘Shocked disbelief’?  
                                      
36  In terms of distortions of reality and cover-ups to keep the status quo, few beat New York City 
mayor and media tycoon Michael Bloomberg when he criticised the ‘occupy-Wall-Street’ protesters 
because their complaints were ‘misplaced’: “...some of [their] complaints [...] are totally 
unfounded. It was not the banks that created the mortgage crisis. It was, plain and simple, 
Congress who forced everybody to go and give mortgages to people who were on the cusp (sic.).” 
(http://www.outsidethebeltway.com/bloomberg-dont-blame-banks-for-mortgage-crisis/).  I wonder 
who is the one barking up the wrong tree, as FED data now shows conclusively that it was private 
mortgage brokers, not Fannie and Freddie, who created the subprime housing bubble.  In fact, “the 
predominant players in the subprime market — mortgage brokers, mortgage companies and the 
Wall Street investment banks that provided the financing — aren’t covered under CRA [the 1997-
Community Reinvestment Act]. [...]. In all, 94 percent of high-cost loans were totally unconnected 
from government homeownership laws.” (http://thinkprogress.org/economy/2011/11/01/358482/ 
bloomberg-mortgage-crisis/).  
Also, Steve Forbes (the Chairman of Forbes Media and a former Republican candidate for 
President) argued along the same lines — that the causes of the financial crisis are simple: “over-
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What ‘shocked disbelief’?   
In other words, first, if until the ‘shocked disbelief’ those involved (politicians, 
mainstream academics, financial markets and financial press) are unable to acknowledge 
the existence of a fundamental problem, why is anybody going to fix it?  And if after the 
shock the new urgency is about moving away from the unbearable awareness, and into a 
new (omnipotent) phase in which the main concern is not the further revelation of truth, 
but the cover up of truth, what is the hope for a proper understanding?  The key issue 
here seems to be the difficulty (perhaps impossibility?) for those involved in creating the 
economic environment that led to the crisis of sustaining their full awareness of what has 
happened.  For example, although many things have already been said regarding the 
speed, the size, and the nature of the rescue operations after each financial crisis 
(including the urgent need to stop the rot, as well as old-boys’ networks at work, 
corruption and so on), perhaps an additional component of these rescue operations 
(particularly their urgency) is that they are a fundamental component of the ‘cover up’.  
When Clinton quickly intervened after the Mexican crisis with his more than $70 billion 
rescue package (in 2010-US$), he was not just saving his mates from Wall Street (who 
had been caught badly exposed in Mexico); most probably, he was also trying to turn the 
page as quickly as possible — so that one could turn a blind eye to the evidence 
emerging from that crisis regarding the risks associated with full financial liberalisation 
(especially of the capital account) in middle-income countries.  The same happened with 
the massive IMF intervention in Brazil and East Asia.  And in the case of Chile, when the 
government was happy to spend more than 50% of GDP rescuing the banking system 
after the 1982 crisis, and when most governments in industrialised countries were all too 
happy to shower financial markets with trillions of dollars following Lehman’s downfall — 
bringing the concept of a ‘soft budget constraint’ to a totally new dimension — perhaps 
(among other things) they were also trying to cover up quickly their unbearable ‘shocked 
disbelief’.  And, inevitably, some eternally optimistic Keynesians were bound to mistake 
the soft budget constraint for a “...vast, Keynesian, fiscal stimuli [...]” (http://www. 
guardian.co.uk/business/2009/jan/18/economic-depression).  That is, instead of being 
part of a cover up, keeping financial dinosaurs on life support was definite evidence that 
‘we are all Keynesian again’!   
Moreover, in the case of the seven financial crises in middle-income DCs discussed 
above, as opposed to the current global financial crisis, the relatively rapid recovery of 
the economies involved greatly helped the cover up.  In fact, perhaps Argentina is the 
only country of the ones discussed above where (despite the rapid recovery) there was at 
least an effort to learn from the pre-crisis mistakes.  
Also, often the cover up extends to personal responsibility.  A clear example is 
that of Larry Summers who, as Clinton’s Treasury Secretary, led the financial de-
regulation brigade that created the conditions under which financial sanity was left to 
depend entirely on ‘self-regulation’ and ‘market discipline’.  Summers, for example, led 
the repeal of the 1933 Glass–Steagall Act, and he also vehemently opposed the 
regulation of derivative contracts.  And then, nearly a decade later, as Obama’s Director 
of the National Economic Council, he had the task to undo a mess that to an important 
extent was his creation.  So, it should probably come as no surprise that when he 
devised Obama’s (so-called) ‘fiscal stimulus’ plan, almost all funds were diverted to keep 
financial relics afloat (and save his own tarnished reputation) rather than to create a 
proper fiscal stimulus on output and employment.37  Furthermore, when he was asked 
                                                                                                                       
sized government and over-burdensome regulation.”  Therefore, not only “the protesters should be 
occupying Congress and not Wall Street”; but also the solution to the financial crisis is 
straightforward: “If we shrank the government and got our fiscal house in order […] inequality and 
joblessness that is fuelling the social frustration would begin to ease of its own accord.” (http:// 
finance.yahoo.com/blogs/daily-ticker/steve-forbes-wall-street-protesters-occupy-congress-instead-
182232426.html?l=1).   
37  Six months into Obama’s ‘stimulus plan’, while over a trillion dollars had been spent (or 
committed) on subsidising financial markets — together with the defence sector, the leading 
welfare recipients in the country — less than 1% had actually been made available for highway and 
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about the collapse of A.I.G. Summers’ response was typical of this third stage in the 
‘awareness/lack-of-awareness’ cycle.  He answered: “[t]here are a lot of terrible things 
that have happened in the last eighteen months, but what's happened at A.I.G. [...] the 
way it was not regulated, the way no one was watching [...] is outrageous." (http:// 
www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/nickrobinson/2011/04/i_told _you_so.html).   
Could it be that this is the same Summers who in 1998, in his testimony before 
Congress, had argued against the regulation of all types of derivative contracts (including 
A.I.G.’s credit default swaps), because “[t]he parties to these kinds of contract are 
largely sophisticated financial institutions that would appear to be eminently capable of 
protecting themselves from fraud and counterparty insolvencies. [...] To date there has 
been no clear evidence of a need for additional regulation of the institutional OTC 
derivatives market, and we would submit that proponents of such regulation [i.e., 
Brooksley Born, the chairperson of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, who 
became strongly in favour of regulation in derivative markets after the LTCM debacle] 
must bear the burden of demonstrating that need." (Ibid.)  Some would argue that 
Summers’ ‘outrage’ at the lack of regulation in derivative markets was just sheer 
hypocrisy, but I would not be at all surprised if by then he had basically lost touch with 
his own past, and he actually believed what he was saying.  
Moreover, in this latter, post-crash, stage (as is often the case in this phase of the 
‘awareness-cycle’), typically a new narrative of each crisis begins to emerge in which 
‘chance’ is often used as a (convenient) validation of the new turning of a blind eye.  
Again, Greenspan provides an example; after having acknowledged the dreadfulness of 
his initial ‘shocked disbelief’, and the major flaw in his economic ideology, he soon began 
to argue that, after all, the 2008 crisis might well have been a ‘one-in-a-hundred-year’ 
event.  That is, it was still possible that the crisis was undeserved and unpredictable after 
all.  Even if everything was pointing in the opposite direction, there was still a chance 
that it was a fortuitous event.  In the same spirit, in most analyses of the 1997 East 
Asian crisis (especially in third-generation models), the fundamental ex post assumption 
is that this crisis started with a bank-run that occurred in Thailand by chance — financial 
markets turning their attention to south-east Asia with some trepidation due to the 
British transfer of Hong Kong to China (Chang and Velasco, 2001).  In turn, second 
generation models want us to believe that the ERM crisis in the UK was just a ‘self-
fulfilling’ shock in an economy that was fundamentally sound — speculators who believe 
(rightly or wrongly) that other speculators were about to attack, were themselves 
encouraged to do so.  The same happened in the 1998 Brazilian crisis; it was all 
supposed to be bad luck: contagion from unrelated events far away — literally, at the 
other end of the world (in Asia and Russia).  And in the case of Korea, the crises 
supposedly occurred  due to a random event: a sudden flight of capital from another 
economy that was also fundamentally sound.  And so on (see Appendix 1).  After all, 
Sophocles had already warned us a long time ago (via one of his characters) that “our 
mortal life is ruled by chance. There is no such thing as foreknowledge” (quoted in 
Steiner, 1993).   
However, as Žižek explains, 
Repetition, according to Hegel, plays a crucial role in history: when something happens just 
once, it may be dismissed as an accident, something that might have been avoided if the 
situation had been handled differently; but when the same event repeats itself, it is a sign 
that a deeper historical process is unfolding. [...] The same holds for [...] financial crises. 
(2011; 1) 
 
Therefore, the convenient use of the idea of ‘chance’ helps preserve the status quo.  This 
‘cover up’ makes it possible to continue living in the phantasy world of the supremacy of 
unregulated ‘free’ markets.  The key point here is that if after the shock (and the 
unbearable awareness) the new urgency is not about the further revelation of truth, but 
the cover up of truth, there is little hope for a proper understanding.  
                                                                                                                       
environmental cleanup projects. (http://money.cnn.com/2009/08/04/news/economy/stimulus_ 
spending/index.htm).  
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And fourth, particularly as far as LA is concerned, yet another part of the answer 
to the above question is a specific element in the genesis of recent financial crises: the 
peculiar politico-institutional framework in which financial liberalisation and economic 
reform were carried out in the region — as opposed to the way in which they were 
implemented in Asia (see Palma, 2011a).  Part of this framework is the ‘original sin’ of 
LA’s economic reforms: the bizarre collection of 'first-generation' heads of state that 
initiated these reforms.  Although not unfamiliar to Latin American political history, 
Pinochet, Salinas, Collor, Menem, Fujimori, Alemán, Bucaram (and many others) 
certainly deserve several entries in The Guinness Book of Records, particularly under the 
headings of opportunism, corruption, human rights abuses, electoral fraud, and petit-
bourgeois parvenu-populism.  Almost invariably, after having initially got into power 
using an anti-neo-liberal discourse (even Pinochet’s initial discourse was closer to that of 
1930s’ Franco than to 1970s’ Friedman), their sudden eagerness to switch to the neo-
liberal camp was in part related to the opportunity to create a new structure of property 
rights from which massive new rents could be extracted.  And, of course, the more 
successful they were in selling the neo-liberal programme, the more extravagant the 
predatory capitalism that followed could be.   
From the perspective of this paper, there are two sides to this story.  One is that 
with these 'first-generation' individuals running the show to begin with, economic reforms 
(particularly privatisations) never stood much of a chance.  As Stiglitz has summarised it 
(rather politely):  
[Is financial liberalisation] being designed on the basis of the best available economic 
theory and evidence, or is there another agenda, perhaps a special interest agenda? 
(Stiglitz, 2000; 1085) 
 
The other is a more complex (and usually forgotten) aspect to this phenomenon.  
Basically, in their eagerness to support the process of economic reform in LA, those 
associated with the Washington Consensus somehow succeeded in turning a blind eye to 
the Russian-style, predatory nature of these reforms, especially the process of 
privatisation.  In fact, it is quite remarkable how in these circles what was going on in 
this respect was basically ignored — from the ‘Chicago-Boys’ in Chile dismantling the 
huge state apparatus for their own benefit (Mönckeberg, 2001), to Salinas’ privatisation 
extravaganza — where one privatisation alone (a telephone company) made one 
individual (practically overnight) the fourth largest billionaire in the world (he then began 
his rapid ascent to become the World’s number one).38  In fact, probably never in the 
history of the region success or failure in business has depended so much on political 
connections as during the first stages of the neo-liberal era.  All this gives Marx’s concept 
of ‘primitive accumulation’ a new meaning.  And despite Menem having run a 
privatisation circus no different from Salinas’, as late as 1998 (i.e., when the Argentinian 
                                      
38  See especially Wolf (2007), and Winter (2007).  As if that was not enough, Salinas handed over 
to Telmex exclusivity in Mexico’s fixed-line market — when one of the most repeated aims of 
privatisation was, supposedly, to encourage competition.  And this has continued afterwards — 
Fox, for example, appointed someone from Telmex as his Minister for Telecommunications.  In fact, 
despite several adverse WTO rulings, Slim still has over a 90% share of the Mexican telephone 
market.  Not surprisingly, in the latest OECD report on broadband download speed (reported 
above), Mexico (accompanied by Chile) had the slowest internet service among all its members 
(with less than 10% the OECD average).  In all, Slim’s share of the Mexican telecommunications 
market is much larger than the combined one of AT&T, MCI, Quest, Sprint, and Verizon in the US 
(Winter 2007).  Furthermore, for a US citizen to have the same share of the US economy as Slim 
has of Mexico’s, she or he would have to own assets of about US$1 trillion. (Ibid.)  According to 
Forbes, this is more that the combined fortune of the top 100 US billionaires (http://www.forbes. 
com/forbes-400/list/).  And Slim is not alone; according to a recent study (quoted in Winter, 
2007), of the top 10 Mexicans on Forbes’ billionaires list in 2011 (with a total net worth of US$124 
billion, about five times the US$25 billion that Mexican Forbes oligarchs had in 2000), half of them 
are ‘creatures of the State’.  Basically, they got there a-la Douglas North’s ‘limited access order’ — 
as they first jumped from the millions to the billions thanks to a process of privatisation which was 
obscure even for the remarkably low standards of other privatisations in the region.    
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economy was already at the edge of the abyss), in the annual meeting of the IMF and the 
World Bank Michel Camdessu (then Head of the IMF) still introduced Menem as ‘the 
President with the best economic polices in the world’ — which is rather like praising Al 
Capone for the orthodoxy of the business model in his beverages venture...   
And by opting for such a blatant ‘turning a blind eye’ to corruption and 
mismanagement, those associated to the Washington Consensus became unable to have 
a clear vision (let alone the capacity for critical analysis) of other aspects of the process 
of reform — which were also contributing in bringing these economies to their respective 
financial crises.  In other words, by turning a blind eye to the region’s worst ever 
‘government failures’ their analytical judgement was also impeded in relation to the 
understanding of the huge ‘market failures’ unfolding in front of their eyes.  Under these 
circumstances, all that mainstream academics and the financial press could do ex ante-
crash was to keep repeating the traditional narrative of the desirability of the reforms 
(i.e., how they were the necessary and practically the sufficient conditions for economic 
success).  And in the ex post-crash ‘lack-of-awareness phase’, instead of looking at the 
key lessons emerging from these financial crises (see conclusions), all they could do was 
to come up with such uncontroversial recommendations as ‘optimal sequences’, or 
(surprise, surprise) the need for ‘good governance’.  That is, mainstream economists 
slowly began to recommend supposedly optimal policies for closing the stable gates only 
well after all the horses had bolted...  
 
Conclusions 
So, the moral of the story of the ‘three routes’ during the second cycle of capital inflows 
(from ‘Brady-bonds’ to the Argentinian 2001/2002-crisis) is that no matter how middle-
income DCs that have opened up their capital account fully have tried to handle the 
absorption of the sudden surges of inflows that usually follows, they have ended up in a 
major financial crisis.  And regarding the current third cycle, the jury is still out in terms 
of both how long the current unprecedented amount of inflows and favourable terms of 
trade would last, and on the nature of the (inevitable) ‘correction’ — no prizes for 
guessing where my money would be (Palma, 2011a). 
To give an indication of the extent of the likely ‘correction’ ahead, although LA’s 
current account deficits in 2010 stood at only 1.1% of GDP, had the terms of trade been 
those of 2003 (the year before the commodity-price-boom), this deficit would have 
jumped to 4.9% (Ocampo, 2011).  Furthermore, this figure is particularly high for those 
countries that benefited most from the commodity-boom.  Chile’s pre-global-financial-
crash current account surplus, for example (4.5% of GDP in 2007), would have 
deteriorated by no less than 19 percentage points of GDP (to a deficit of 14.4% of GDP) 
if 2003-terms-of-trade-terms had applied.  Corresponding figures for 2010 were a 
surplus of 1.9% vs. a deficit of 15.5%!  In other words, at the time of writing LA not only 
had already adjusted fully to its new terms of trade and abundance of inflows (as if these 
were a permanent state of affairs), but it has done so mostly via increased consumption.  
Therefore, if its terms of trade were to return to its pre-commodity-boom levels, or if the 
current levels of inflows were to reverse drastically (both events entirely likely), the 
domestic adjustment needed in many countries would be no different from that of the 
1982-debt-crisis (or worse).  And if both adjustments were to take place simultaneously, 
it could be like Greece but without German taxpayers.  In other words, the post-2003 
commodity-price-cum-inflows-led recovery is so fragile that candles should be lit for 
speculators continuing to believe commodities to be the sole remaining one-way-bet, and 
that China and India continue their (forced) march towards their rightful place under the 
sun.  
Of course, with hindsight, one can always think of hypothetical ways in which the 
worst excesses in each route could have been avoided, but the fact is that surges in 
inflows into economies with newly open capital accounts have created such pro-cyclical 
dynamics and risk accumulation that they have proved extraordinarily difficult to absorb.  
And as Brazil has shown, desperate attempts to deal with the open capital 
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account/inflow-problem via sterilisation and ‘tough’ monetary policies, instead of helping 
to avoid a financial crisis, it just changes the nature of the crisis.  As mentioned above, 
the paradox of Brazil’s ‘route-2’ is that it created a financial crisis by trying to avoid one!  
In all probability, ‘first-best’ capital controls (i.e., an attempt to deal with the problem at 
source) could have been a much more effective way forward.39  
All of the above makes it difficult to understand the direction followed by 
mainstream literature on financial crises.  As is well known, in financial literature ‘second 
generation’ crises are supposed to be harmless to the real economy (i.e., a purely 
monetary phenomenon), as well as undeserved and unpredictable.  And those of the 
‘third generation’ are again supposed to be undeserved and unpredictable; however, this 
time they can have a major impact on output and employment due to large currency 
depreciation causing havoc with corporate balance sheets (see Appendix 1).  From this 
perspective, one of the main points of this paper is to show that all three routes, but 
especially ‘1’ and ‘2’, have little to do with this ‘undeserved’ and ‘unpredictable’ scenario.  
Rather, what these countries had were truly deserved and fairly predictable financial 
crises.40  The financial fragilities of ‘route-3’ are more intricate, but only Malaysia could 
possibly argue that its crisis was, to a certain extent, ‘undeserved’ (i.e., mostly 
contagion; see Ocampo and Palma, 2007).  
The end result of all of the above (and in particular the four issues discussed in 
Section 5) is that mainstream crises-literature has ended up paying little attention to 
(what I believe are) the four main issues surrounding financial crises in DCs with open 
capital accounts: i) Why is it that the incentive mechanisms and resource allocation 
dynamics of ‘friendly-regulated’ domestic financial and asset markets have failed so badly 
under the pressure of surges in inflows (and the resulting abundance of liquidity) by 
purely endogenous reasons?  As a result, otherwise ‘utility-maximising’ agents operating 
in ‘light-touch’ regulated financial markets have ended up accumulating more risk than 
was privately, let alone socially, efficient.  This excessive amount of risk has become 
evident in the alternate phase of the cycle, that of the sudden-stop in external 
financing.41  ii) Why is it that some basic adjustment mechanisms — such as relative 
price adjustments (e.g., real exchange rates) — have also failed badly when faced with 
such sharp changes in external and domestic liquidity?  Instead of helping to bring these 
economies back to a sustainable growth path, these adjustment mechanisms have 
tended to augment the cycle (no ‘self-adjusting’ equilibria here).  As mentioned above, 
the imbalances created by the liberalisation of capital accounts and inflow-booms, instead 
of being tamed by ‘automatic stabilisers’ have been amplified by automatic ‘destabilisers’.  
iii), Why is it that in financially-liberalised economies market forces have often pushed 
governments and central banks into pro-cyclical policies (and politics!) rather than into 
counter-cyclical ones?  And iv) as the successful Chilean and Colombian experiences with 
capital controls in the 1990s show, there is a clear rôle for ‘proactive agency’ (e.g., public 
policy and regulation) in order to counteract the pro-cyclical dynamics of open capital 
accounts — and of financial liberalisation in general.  In fact, mainstream economics 
aversion to them (‘any intervention would simply make things worse’-type attitude) 
resembles what a Chilean President famously said at the beginning of the 20th Century: 
“In life there are two types of problems, those that will get solved by themselves, and 
                                      
39  Despite its 1998/99 financial crisis, Brazil has continued with many of its ‘route-2’ policies, 
leading to a situation in which the current cost of sterilisation has reached a level well above US$50 
billion a year — not least because its recent taxes on inflows (only applied in the heat of a 
presidential campaign in which the official candidate was not doing very well) are so porous that 
speculators only have to pay them if they have a bad accountant.  This is perhaps not surprising, 
because for the Brazilian government to have forced the current Central Bank to implement capital 
controls is equivalent to having forced a vegetarian to manage a butcher-shop.  
40  For a prediction of the Mexican crisis, see TDR (1994).  For that of Brazil, see Palma (1998).  
For a pre-crisis warning on East Asia’s growing financial fragilities, see BIS (1997); and for one of 
the current crisis, see Rajan (2005).  
41 For Kindleberger (2000), there is one thing international financial markets can do that is even 
more damaging for DCs than ‘over-lending’: to halt that lending abruptly. 
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those that have no solution” (see Palma, 2009b).  The contemporary mainstream version 
of this (‘market-submissive’, and rather unambitious) world-view is that now in financial 
markets there are only two types of problems: those that markets can be solved by 
themselves (helped by more liberalisation), and those that have no solution.” 
My main argument in this paper is that the fundamental explanation of these 
crises points not just to a major ‘market failure’, but to a systemic market failure: 
evidence suggests that some financial crises, as those studied here, are basically the 
spontaneous outcome of actions by supposedly utility-maximising cum ‘rational’ 
expectations agents, freely operating in ‘light-touch’ regulated, over-liquid financial 
markets.   
One issue here is that financial markets, (as opposed to many other markets), 
invariably have had the capacity to clear regardless of their amount of liquidity.  And 
they do so only partially by reducing charges, margins and spreads to traditional 
customers; they also do so by opening-up new ‘outlets’ for that liquidity (in which they 
actually do the opposite).  That is, they did not only opened-up a new sub-prime ‘outlet’, 
but after a short ‘teaser’ period, sub-prime mortgages usually became two to three times 
more expensive than normal mortgages.  
The issue here is that only when financial markets operate as a ‘sellers markets’ 
(i.e., relative shortage of liquidity), they can unload their liquidity without accumulating 
an amount of risk that is privately — let alone socially — inefficient.  But when excess 
liquidity turns them into a ‘buyers markets’, the process of ‘clearing’ invariably leads to 
the opposite environment, as they have to create (i.e., literally invent) a sufficient level 
of demand for that liquidity (no matter what).  In extreme cases, any new demand would 
do — even people with ‘no income, no job, and no assets’, as the famous ‘NINJA’ 
mortgage in the recent sub-prime debacle, when financial markets under the pressure of 
having to clear excess liquidity (and after having exhausted every possible alternative,  
and independently from the 1977-Community Reinvestment Act), change their business-
motto to ‘Redlining is no more’!  That is, when financial markets began a process known 
as ‘reverse redlining’ — i.e., when lenders and insurers begin to target specifically those 
consumers that had been previously denied those services altogether (consumers that 
had been previously part of redliners’ blacklists).   
And in order to create new ‘outlets’ for their liquidity, financial markets usually 
follow an age-old device: they lower their operational standards, and they reduce the 
transaction costs of this liquidity (a signature would do).  Also, as the current Chair of the 
FSA recently stated at the annual Mansion House banquet (quoted above), “swollen 
financial markets” tend to produce "socially useless products and innovations, including a 
number of derivatives and hedging products, and aspects of the asset management 
industry and equity trading.  [So] markets are not always wise” 
(http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/ab724158-a7a2-11de-b0ee-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1eU 
zyS4Yq).  And yet another traditional clearing mechanism by ‘swollen’ financial markets 
(especially relevant for the subject of this paper) is the re-discovery of emerging markets 
— as mentioned above, for international financial markets DCs have traditionally played a 
‘customer of last resort’ rôle (e.g., in the 1820s, 1860s, 1920s, 1970s and 2000s.42   
Another crucial component in the dynamics leading to the creation of the 
necessary clearing levels of demand has been emphasised by Kindleberger (2000): a 
sudden access to easy credit invariably leads to a surge in expectations and animal 
spirits.  This process then reinforces itself, becoming yet another self-fulfilling prophesy.  
Easy access to cheap credit fuels the expectations of future performance — a 
performance that is enhanced by the additional expenditure brought about by the extra 
borrowing.  ‘Over-lending’ and ‘over-borrowing’ became therefore not only the result of a 
closely interrelated process, but also one that had a clear direction of causality: the 
propensity to ‘over-lend’ led to the propensity to ‘over-borrow.’  
In other words, markets as a whole are not always right — indeed, in the case of 
                                      
42  For how this connects to the technology cycle, see Pérez (2002).   
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financial markets they can be seriously wrong as a whole.  For example, in the financial 
crises analysed in this paper there is plenty of evidence that over-liquid and ‘light-
touched’-regulated financial markets can be driven by buyers who take little notice of 
underlying values — i.e., when investors have incentives to interpret information in a 
biased fashion in a systematic way.  At the same time, as LTCM learnt the hard way (one 
year after its founder wining the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics), high liquidity can 
easily make assets that appeared to belong to independent clusters in the past to 
become correlated — so, diversification against those clusters cannot provide sufficient 
‘staying power’ anymore.  Also, as the recent collapse of ‘MF Global’ (and its ‘missing’ 
customer funds) indicate — a collapse brought about by an over-reliance on short-term 
funding, which dried up as revelations of its leveraged bets on European sovereign debt 
came to light — the capacity of agents operating in unregulated financial market to learn 
from previous mistakes seem rather limited.  For Keynes, perhaps, this would not come 
as a surprise; according to Deane,  
“[t]he iconoclastic conclusion of [Keynes’] analysis was that there was no invisible hand 
translating private self-interests into social benefit.  This was the nub of the Keynesian 
heresy.” (1980, 182)  
 
In reality, in over-liquid financial markets there seem to be no invisible hand able to 
translate private self-interests into private benefits in a sustainable way either!  From 
this point of view, maybe the invisible hand is so invisible simply because it does not 
really exist — or, if it does, there is plenty of evidence that indicates that it becomes 
overwhelmed by the dynamics of over-liquid financial markets.  Or, perhaps, under these 
circumstances it just prefers to take sabbatical leave. 
The essential point here is that mainstream economists will continue to find it 
difficult to get anywhere near a proper understanding of financial crisis until they give up 
their ‘idolatry’ of the market — idolatry in the sense of a ‘worship of a thing’ (see Britton, 
2002).  As Stiglitz has said, this crisis is not just the outcome of a market failure here or 
there, “but of a total failure of financial markets” (http://www.youtube.com/user/TheFlaw 
Movie?blend=3&ob=5).  And the argument that this only happened because we still do 
not have ‘complete markets’ sounds increasingly hollow — A.I.G., for example, with its 
new type of derivatives, had moved precisely into previously ‘missing’ insurance markets.   
In fact, over-liquid financial markets are so difficult to tame that one should not 
idealise the effectiveness of financial regulation either.  Paraphrasing Churchill, perhaps 
the best thing one could say about ‘regulated’ financial markets is that “many forms of 
resource allocation have been tried and will be tried in this world of sin and woe.  No one 
should pretend that under excess-liquidity conditions the one done by ‘regulated markets’ 
is perfect or all-wise.  Indeed, it has been said that under these conditions regulated 
financial markets are the worst form of resource allocation, except for all those other 
forms that have been tried from time to time.”   
In other words, there is no substitute for avoiding that financial markets become 
over-liquid in the first place.  That is, the first best option is to keep them ‘tight’, because 
once they become ‘swollen’, even New-Deal/Bretton-Woods-type regulation would 
inevitably struggle.   
As Keynes once remarked, ‘markets can remain irrational far longer than you or I 
can remain solvent.’  Even Adam Smith thought that irrational behaviour could have a 
real impact on the markets.  As emphasised before, the environment in which this is 
more likely to happen is that of excess liquidity — leading agents to accumulate more 
risk than what is privately efficient via increased and growingly fragile leverages, asset 
bubbles, and so on.  Excess liquidity is also bound to create conditions which exacerbate 
problems such as skewed incentives for managers, herding behaviour among traders, 
investment bankers and hedge fund managers who are under constant threat of 
withdrawals of funds if they under-perform the market, etc.  In DCs, sudden surges of 
inflows have proved to be a paradigmatic case of this, where stock markets can grow on 
average at 87%, 49% and 48% p.a. for many years in a row (as in Chile, Argentina and 
Mexico, respectively; see Figure 8 above).  It would take a very brave investment 
manager, blessed with infinitely patient investors, to fight trends like these — even if 
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they patently are deviations from fundamental values (Rajan, 2005).  And DCs are not 
alone in this: in Portugal between 9/11 and the 2008 financial crisis, for example, the 
value of the stock of financial assets grew 17 times faster than GDP; in Spain it did so by 
8 times, and in Greece by 6 — as the value of its stock of financial assets grew at no less 
than 24% p.a. (i.e., in Greece, of all countries, the value of the stock of financial assets 
trebled in the five years before the crisis).  Can anybody argue with a straight face that 
something real was actually happening in these economies to justify these financial 
euphorias?  Or that in, say, Greece or Portugal asset prices were rising like this in order 
to reflect new available information, or more solid fundamentals?  In the meantime, in 
Eastern Europe the value of the stock of financial assets also grew far ahead of GDP 
(eight times faster), in LA six times, and in Africa five (see Figure 1 above).  To dismiss 
these types of experiences as simply ‘not empirically efficient’ (Malkiel, 2007) is what 
gives economics a bad name.  
As Pascal once said (1662), “man is equally incapable of seeing the nothingness 
out of which he was drawn and the infinite in which he is engulfed.”  Despite the 
insistence of mainstream analysis, many financial crises (like those studied here) take 
place mostly due to factors that are intrinsic (or inherent) to the workings of over-liquid 
and under-regulated financial markets — rather than to extrinsic (or relational) ones.  
That is, it is unlikely that the same over-liquid and under-regulated financial markets 
would have worked much differently had they been operating in different surroundings.  
From this point of view, the main weakness of the mainstream understandings of 
financial crises is that they suffer from ‘extrinsicism’, or the tendency to place major 
emphasis on external matters rather than on more profound realities.43  And by doing so, 
most mainstream economists miss the point entirely: the tragedy of these financial crises 
does not lay on the supposed inevitable recurrence of government failures — and 
certainly not on chance — but in the fact that these crises, more often than not, are fully 
deserved and fairly predictable. 
From this point of view, they belong to what Oscar Wilde calls ‘the real tragedies 
of life’, those that “occur in such an inartistic manner that they hurt us by their crude 
violence, their absolute incoherence, their absurd want of meaning, their entire lack of 
style.  They affect us just as vulgarity affects us. They give us an impression of sheer 
brute force, and we revolt against that.” (1890)  
Even new behavioural psychology approaches, no matter how appealing, so far 
have just highlighted biases in individuals and committees and not in ‘unregulated and 
over-liquid’ financial markets; i.e., the latter are still idealised as such — i.e., the 
problems do not lie in them, but in the fact that (unfortunately) they are populated by 
imperfect individuals.44  After all Adam Smith had already warned us long ago that  
"The overweening conceit which the greater part of men have of their own abilities is an 
ancient evil remarked by the philosophers and moralists of all ages." (1776; B.1, Ch. 10)  
Perhaps the main lesson of these financial crises is that it is about time to think again (as 
some are trying — e.g., Taylor (2010); Davidson (2009); Harcourt (2011); Bibow (2009) 
— just to mention a few) about all the complex theoretical issues that led Minsky to 
conclude that finance could so easily become fragile; that led Kindleberger to warn us 
about how excess liquidity leads us to oscillate between manias and panics; and, 
especially, that led Keynes to conclude that: “[...] above all, let finance be primarily 
national.” (1933; 759). 
                                      
43  An analogy in ethics would be in the difference between emphasising the external observance of 
laws and precepts, and emphasising the ultimate principles underlying moral conduct. 
44  In a seminar on the subject, the speaker concluded that investment banks should have more 
‘balanced’ trading teams in terms of age and gender (to avoid excessive risk-taking at the wrong 
time by the usual testosterone-abundant young-male brigades).  However, I argued that if that 
was the problem maybe a more efficient trading strategy would be to play like in American football, 
and alternate the trading teams according to the circumstances — sending a ‘defensive formation’ 
to the trading floor (i.e., with an appropriate age and gender structure) when a more cautious 
strategy is required, and an ‘offensive’ (testosterone-plentiful) one only when the opposite strategy 
is more likely to yield higher returns...  
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Needless to say, a fundamental part of this task is to turn Lucas’ famous ‘residue 
of things’ upside-down — according to him (see epigraph at the beginning of the paper),  
“The problem that the new theories, the theories embedded in general equilibrium 
dynamics of the sort that we know how to use pretty well now — there's a residue of things 
they don't let us think about. They don't let us think about the U.S. experience in the 
1930s, or about financial crises and their real consequences in Asian and Latin America, 
they don't let us think very well about Japan in the 1990s.” (Lucas, 2004; 23)  
 
That is, part of the task ahead is about transforming these ‘odd things’ that mainstream 
economics sees as ‘residue’ — including, of course, the current global financial crisis —
into the events which form part of the corner-stone of our analytical thinking on how 
financial markets actually work in the real world.45  
However, given the complex current political and economic environment, to be 
able to think again about these complex theoretical ‘things’ one has to deal with at least 
two main risks.  One is that unless the above ‘re-thinking’ is done with a purpose, 
heterodox economics runs the risk that its discourse could be overcome by ‘the 
narcissism of lost causes.’  That is, sometimes it’s just too easy to admire the sublime 
beauty of critical reason doomed to be marginalised.  The other risk, of course, is (in a 
sense) the opposite: it is also too easy to avoid marginalisation by quitting critical 
thinking, and absorbing the fundamentals of the alternative hegemonic (mainstream) 
paradigm — ending up with a ‘prudent’ discourse made of scepticism cum a progressive 
social substance (although with the latter in the area of ‘diminishing returns’ — a-la-‘new’ 
left?).  The problem with critical thinking, of course, is that it is a distancing, even 
debilitating, activity.  It distances us from conventions, from established assumptions 
and from settled beliefs.  It takes what we know from familiar, unquestioned settings and 
makes it strange.  And it does so not necessarily by supplying new information, but by 
inviting and provoking a new way of seeing.  Therefore, a key challenge ahead for 
heterodox economics is how to steer a course that avoids both types of evasion: that of 
the beauty of the ‘lost-cause’, and that of prudent ‘uncritical’ thinking — not least 
because when reality is evaded, it is also bound to be distorted and misrepresented.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                      
45  Charles Kindleberger used to say that when economists run time series in which dummies are 
used to account for ‘special’ events, more often than not the only analytically interesting thing in 
the whole regression is what happened in those events accounted for by dummies.  
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Appendix 1 
The main issue behind the existence of ‘generation-models’ of financial crises is that mainstream 
economics cannot accept the possibility that the autonomous outcome of the free interaction of 
supposedly utility-maximising cum ‘rational’ expectations agents, interacting in (excessively) 
‘friendly-regulated’ financial markets, could be an endogenous financial crisis.  The outcome of the 
above could only be some sort of ‘equilibrium’; this may well be a ‘sub-optimal’ one, but it has to 
be an equilibrium of sorts.  From this point of view, a financial ‘crisis’ proper can only take place if 
there is some kind of interference in the incentive mechanisms and/or resource allocation dynamics 
of financial markets.  Examples of the latter are lax fiscal discipline, fixed exchange rates with a 
wrong peg, central bankers/finance ministers unwilling to take tough action when necessary, self-
fulfilling loops (e.g., bank runs), and so on.46  As these ‘interferences’ vary from one crisis to 
another, their models can only be developed after the event.  
The so-called ‘first generation’ models tried to explain the currency crises in the US in the 
early 1970s.  Presidents Johnson and Nixon followed inconsistent macroeconomic policies: 
persistent deficits with a fixed exchange rate peg.  So, the US got the crisis it deserved — Nixon 
run out of reserves.  This was an inevitable outcome (given the policies); and its timing was fairly 
predictable.  Finally, ‘first-generation’ crises seem to do no harm, as they only reveal an economic 
problem that was there in the first place.   
The inspiration for second-generation modelling was the speculative attack on the 
European fixed-exchange currency system (ERM), which started with the run on the Pound Sterling 
in 1992.  The UK had entered the ERM in October 1990, but was forced to exit in 1992 when its 
currency came under major pressure from speculators.  There were several obvious differences 
between the UK 1992-crisis and the assumptions of ‘first-generation’ models.  Seignorage was not 
the issue, but the willingness of the British government to defend the peg; as many considered 
that the pound sterling had entered the ERM at an overvalued rate, the British government had to 
show that it would do what it took to defend that peg.  Therefore, the crisis took place not because 
the government run out of reserves (as in the US); the abandonment of the peg was a matter of 
policy choice: in 1992 the British Chancellor chose not to pay the price for defending the peg 
(higher interest rates), while French officials made the opposite decision a year later (when it was 
the turn of the Franc to come under attack).  So, ‘second generation’ models are about an 
imperfect commitment to a currency peg.  When the peg ceases to be credible, investors will 
demand higher interest rates in order to hold assets denominated in the country’s currency.  As 
macroeconomic polices before the crisis are not irresponsible, crises are not ‘deserved’; neither are 
they ‘predictable’, as their nature is mostly about chance — i.e., ‘self-fulfilling’ crises of confidence 
in which speculators who believe that other speculators are about to attack are themselves 
encouraged to do so.  As everything is about forcing a currency off its peg, there is no reason for a 
negative shock on output or employment.  In fact, as a result of the crisis an artificial policy 
constraint is removed (the peg), its impact could well be positive.   
Finally, as the latter was clearly not the case in 1997-East Asia, ‘third-generation’ models 
try to explain why abandoning a peg could be at times so harmful to output and employment.  
There are several narratives.  One is the ‘moral-hazard-driven’ investment-booms creating 
excessive external debt; others are open-economy versions of bank-runs (crises occur due to a 
sudden flight of capital from economies that were not fundamentally unsound); finally, a third story 
stresses the balance-sheet implications of currency depreciation.  At the end, the most common 
narrative mixed several of the above issues: problems began due to moral-hazard-driven bubbles, 
which were followed by balance-sheet driven crises when the bubbles burst.  Therefore, in ‘third-
generation’ models crises become harmful because they are no longer about problems with 
monetary policy.  Basically, they are also about chance: something — as Krugman (2001) says, it 
could be almost anything — causing a sudden large currency depreciation; and this depreciation 
creating havoc with balance sheets.  On their liability side, if the price of foreign exchange suddenly 
rises, and firms have substantial foreign currency debts, their net worth falls.  And on the asset 
side of balance sheets, the story is one of a decline in confidence leading to a fall in asset prices, 
which leads to a fall in investment that validates both the decline in asset prices and the fall in 
confidence.  The economy thus plunges into a crisis in the real economy on both accounts.  
In sum, in first-generation models scenarios crises are supposed to be ‘deserved’ and predictable, 
but not harmful to the real economy.  In second-generation ones, instead, crises are ‘undeserved’ 
and unpredictable, but still not harmful.  Finally, in third-generation scenarios, financial crises are 
again ‘undeserved’ and unpredictable, but this time they are instead harmful (as they are not just 
about problems with monetary policy).   
                                      
46  For a brief summary and bibliography, see Krugman (2001).   
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